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REGULATING FETAL RESEARCH

The Controversy
Research on the fetus embraces a complex mixture of ethical,
legal, and medical issues. The effort to regulate it has been characterized by a struggle between doctor-researchers who support
fetal experimentation to eliminate or alleviate a variety of ills
which afflict mankind, and a lay population which opposes fetal
experimentation as an assault on the sanctity of human life.
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The controversy has been fueled by the debate on abortion.'
Much fetal research has taken place on fetuses scheduled for
abortion; and as the number of abortions has increased, this research has become more visible and frequent.2 At root, both practices compel a response to a vexing question: When do the full
rights of personhood attach to a developing human being?
Many in the research community assert that a fetus is not
human, or at least is not protectible in a fully human sense.' They
laud the substantial benefits which are accruing from fetal experimentation, pointing out that the general, overwhelming purpose
of such experimentation is to improve prenatal care for fetuses
which are to be carried to full term. Their detractors, however,
view the doctor-researchers as callous, impersonal investigators
who place scientific inquiry over regard for human life. They
believe a fetus is a fellow human being who should not be subjected to unwarranted scientific manipulation.'
1.

Types of Research

To disentangle the threads of this dispute, an understanding
of the nature of fetal experimentation is necessary. Medical researchers engaged in fetal experimentation have concentrated on
four areas of study: First, research concerning the growth and
development of the fetus in utero; second, diagnosis and observation of fetal diseases and genetic disorders; third, improvement
of fetal therapy and pharmacology; and fourth, research on the
nonviable fetus ex utero. Each of these areas is discussed separately below.
See N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1973, at 20, col. 3.
Scarf, The Fetus as a Guinea Pig, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1975, § 6 (Magazine), at
13. Nearly 900,000 abortions were performed in the United States in 1974, an increase of
30% in two years. In New England there were 51,700 legal abortions in 1974, compared
with 6,700 in 1972. Boston Globe, Feb. 3, 1975, at 2, col. 5.
' See generally, Martin, Ethical Standards for Fetal Experimentation, 43 FoRDHAm
L. REv. 547 (1975).
1 Those opposed to fetal research point to the possible "brutalizing" effect such
practices can have on community ethical standards. They point to the example of research
on children: In the nineteenth century, children from orphanages were used in research
projects. It is generally agreed that the effort to protect the fetus is simply an extension
of the humanitarian impulse to protect children which resulted in child protection statutes-a relatively recent phenomenon. For a general discussion of the legal protection of
children see Paulsen, The Legal Framework for Child Protection,66 COLUM. L. REv. 679,
680-86 (1966).
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a. Growth and development
There is still a paucity of knowledge about the physiological
development and the sequential changes in the biochemical
growth of the fetus.' The study of fetal growth and development
in utero is essential, since medical practitioners must first comprehend the intricacies of fetal anatomy, physiology, organ function, sensory capacity, and metabolism in order to meaningfully
diagnose and treat fetal disorders before birth.
Much experimentation in this area is conducted on dead
fetuses through autopsy or on live fetal tissue or organs excised
from dead fetuses. Other experiments have involved the monitoring of fetal response and behavior through ultrasound and by fetal
electroencephalogram.' To acquire a better understanding of fetal
metabolism, researchers have examined both fluid withdrawn
from the amniotic sac surrounding the fetus and samples of blood
taken from the umbilical cord.7 Other studies have involved the
injection of nonradioactive tracers (such as carbon-13) into the
amniotic cavity in order to monitor the dispersal or absorption of
those tracers.8
b. Diagnosis
Researchers concerned with improving the diagnosis of fetal
disorders have considered the problems of genetic defects, neural
tube defects, Rh incompatibility, and Respiratory Distress Syndrome. This research has had a largely predictive purpose and is
designed to permit physicians to assess the health and development of the fetus in utero.
The diagnostic technique used in most cases is amniocentesis, a procedure which involves withdrawing fluid from the
amniotic sac surrounding the fetus for subsequent analysis.' First
I Marx, Drugs During Pregnancy:Do They Affect the Unborn Child?, 180 Sci. 174,
175 (1973).
1 Mahoney (principal investigator), The Nature and Extent of Research Involving
Live Human Fetuses, in THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAvIoRAL RESEARCH, RESEARCH ON THE FETus: APPENDIX 4 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Mahoney Report].
Id. at 10-11, 23.
Id. at 13.
Kaback, Leisti, & Levine, Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis, in ENDOCRINE AND GENETIC
DISEASES OF CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE 1241, 1243 (2d ed. L. Gardner ed. 1975).
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used as a clinical procedure in 1882, this technique, combined
with substantial progress in tissue culture research, has greatly
expanded the intrauterine diagnosis of chromosomal and metabolic disorders. However, amniocentesis is capable of detecting
only the most severe disorders; 0 and there is a slight chance that
it may harm the fetus." Fetoscopy and ultrasound may prove to
be superior for diagnostic purposes, but both are still in the early
stages of development.
Often diagnostic research is undertaken in conjunction with
the treatment of prenatal disorders. In the case of Rh incompatibility, Respiratory Distress Syndrome, and neural tube disorders-major causes of infant mortality- intrauterine therapy
may be available if the condition is diagnosed. For example, in
the case of Respiratory Distress Syndrome, corticosteroids can be
administered to correct certain chemical deficiencies which cause
lung immaturity in the infant. Diagnostic procedures may also
be employed to determine whether the physician should induce
premature birth to avert serious harm to the fetus and the mother
which could result from certain prenatal disorders if the preg3
nancy were carried to full term.
Diagnostic research may reveal the presence of such grave
abnormalities that abortion would be recommended. However,
advances in medical knowledge through further research may actually result in saving many fetuses from abortion. For example,
if both parents carry a gene for certain kinds of serious disorders,
such as Tay Sachs, there is currently a one-in-four chance of their
having a severely defective child. Given these odds, many parents
choose to abort. As a result of research on the prenatal diagnosis
of blood diseases, however, these parents can find out if their
fetus is free of serious defects; and the mother may then decide
to carry it to full term."
11Id. at 1243. Of more than several hundred disorders, only slightly more than sixty
can be diagnosed using amniocentesis; however, virtually all chromosomal abnormalities
are potentially detectable with the use of amniocentesis. Id. at 1258. See also Levin,
Oxman, Moore, Daniels, & Sheer, Diagnosisof CongenitalRubella In Utero, 290 NEW ENG.
J. OF MED. 1187 (1974).
Mahoney Report 11.
I at 10.
Id.
' Id. at 25.
" Boston Globe, Feb. 15, 1975, at 24, col. 1. Five women with either sickle cell trait
or Cooley's anemia trait elected not to have abortions when fetoscopy-a new technique
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Fetal therapy and pharmacology

The purpose of pharmacological research is to discover which
drugs and agents administered for maternal and fetal care during
pregnancy are the safest and most effective. Drug transfer studies
are frequently undertaken to determine whether certain drugs
will cross the placental barrier and have an impact on the fetus,
or will instead affect only the mother. 15 Often drug transfer research involves only an autopsy examination of fetal tissues.
Since the average woman takes six drugs or agents during or prior
to discovering her pregnancy, researchers have retrospectively
examined the impact of those drugs on fetuses following abortions
or natural births."6 The effects of analgesics, hormones, birth control pills, addictive drugs, insulin, anticonvulsants, anesthetics,
and drugs taken for maternal disease treatment have all been
studied in this manner. 7
Recently there has been a movement in the research community to expand the scope of pharmacological research. Researchers have sought to concentrate exclusively on fetuses scheduled for abortion, since they are able to utilize experimental drugs
without fearing the adverse consequences on research subjects
who will survive."8 While animal experimentation must precede
research on human subjects for purposes of eliminating avoidable
research risks, there is no alternative to testing on human subjects at some point, because of significant physiological differences between animals and humans. The most notable example
of the need for preliminary testing of drugs on human subjects
occurred in the development of rubella vaccine. Researchers developed a rubella serum that did not pass through animal placentas and presumably was safe for use by pregnant women. In subsequent testing on human subjects, however, the vaccine passed
through the placenta and damaged the fetus. As a result, doctors
for examining the fetus in utero-and removal of a sample of fetal blood from the placenta
revealed that their fetuses were free from defects. Id.
," See Marx, supra note 5, at 175. See also Philipson, Sabath, & Charles,
TransplacentalPassage of Erythromycin and Clindamycin, 288 NEw ENG. J. OF MED. 1219
(1973).
'1 Forfar & Nelson, Epidemiology of drugs taken by pregnantwomen: Drugs that may
affect the fetus adversely, 14 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY AND THERAPEUTIcs 632 (1973).
'7 Mahoney Report, Table I at 15.
" Id. at 36-39.
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were able to caution mothers to refrain from taking rubella vaccine prior to or during pregnancy." Had there been no prior testing on fetuses to be aborted, another thalidomide-type disaster
might have occurred.
d. Research on fetal tissue and nonviable fetuses ex
utero
The vast majority of reported research on fetuses ex utero is
restricted to dead fetal subjects. After the death of a fetus, many
tissues can be utilized to study tissue and cell growth as well as
metabolic and cellular function. 0 Tissue cultures from human
fetuses have become indispensable for the growth of certain viruses and for the development of viral vaccines to combat major
illnesses.?' According to one authority:
[TIhe legal prohibition of the investigative use of embryonic and
fetal tissues derived from dead human embryos or fetuses . . . will
gravely retard the advancement of medical knowledge in many
areas. Examples of such areas are: (1) the further understanding of
the causes and development of means for the prevention of fetal
abnormalities; (2) the alterations in cellular mechanisms underlying
transformation of normal human cells to cancer cells and the immunologic factors involved in resistance to cancer; and (3) the development of vaccines not now available against viral and other infectious
micro-organisms such as varicella virus, cytomegalovirus and the
agents of hepatitis and mycoplasma. Regarding the last-mentioned
area of investigation, it should be realized that the development of
the prophylactics now generally employed in the prevention of poliomyelitis, measles and German measles stemmed from the results
of original studies with human embryonic tissues.Y

In addition to experimentation involving dead fetuses and
fetal tissue, research has been conducted on nonviable ex utero
fetuses which exhibit signs of life. This type of research is extremely rare: No more than 20 cases were reported out of 3,000
citations of fetal research throughout the world in the last decade.13 Experimentation ranges from simple observation and

11

THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HumAN SuJEcTs OF BIoMEDicAL

AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, RESEARCH ON THE FETUs: REPORT AND REcOMMENDATIONS,

in 40

Fed. Reg. 33,530, 33,534-35 (1975) [hereinafter cited as FETAL RESEARCH REPORT].
" Mahoney Report 22.
21 Id.
2 Letter from Dr. John F. Enders to the Editor, 290 NEW ENO. J. OF MED. 1199 (1974).
2 FETAL RESEARCH REPORT 33,534.
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monitoring of fetuses with instruments such as EEG, X-rays, and
radioisotope scans," to more invasive procedures designed to artificially maintain fetal life functions for purposes of developing an
artificial placenta which would enable doctors to increase the
potential for survival of premature infants.25
2.

Abuses

Despite the minimal risk associated with much, but certainly
not all, fetal research and its beneficient objectives, abuses have
taken place." Some experiments, such as the administration of
drugs of unknown danger to fetuses to be aborted, involve practices about which there might be reasonable disagreement. Similarly, research on the nonviable fetus which involves only measurement or minor invasive procedures is not likely to stir heated
debate.
Other experiments on the nonviable fetus, however, raise
serious ethical questions. For example, in one preliminary attempt to develop a fetal incubator, 15 fetuses (9-24 weeks' gestation) obtained from induced abortions were immersed in a salt
solution containing oxygen at extremely high pressure, in an attempt to provide oxygen for the fetuses through the skin.2 As the
determinants of life were a pulsating umbilical cord or visible
heartbeat, the fetuses' chests were opened whenever necessary to
observe their hearts. In this experiment, four fetuses were supported artificially, i.e., denied death, for 22 hours.2 1 In another
example, a study to determine fetal brain metabolism of ketone
bodies, the heads of eight fetuses (12-17 weeks' gestation) were
severed from their bodies after heartbeat had ceased . 2 While
death had technically occurred, life at the cellular level continued
Mahoney Report 22.
Id. at 24-25.
2 Cf. Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEw ENG. J. OF MED. 1354 (1966)
(describing 22 unethical experiments involving human subjects). At one eastern hospital,
terminally ill patients were injected with live cancer cells without obtaining their informed
consent. Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 21 App. Div. 2d 495, 251 N.Y.S,2d 818
(1964), rev'd, 15 N.Y.2d 317, 206 N.E.2d 338, 258 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1965).
2 Goodlin, Cutaneous Respiration in a Fetal Incubator, 86 AM. J. OBSTET. GYNECOL.
571, 578 (1963).
n Id.
2 Adam, Raiha, Rahiala, et al., CerebralOxidation of Glucose and D-BOH-Butyrate
by the Isolated Perfused Human Fetal Head, 7 PEMIAThiC RESEARCH 309 (1973).
',
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in the brain, and thus it was possible to measure the extent to
which fetal cerebral tissues30 could metabolize D-BOH-Butyrate as

an alternative to glucose.

B.

Regulating Fetal Research
The potential value of fetal research has not stilled the voices
of those who view it as an unwarranted assault on the integrity
of living human beings. The protest against fetal research has
taken several forms, including the use of the criminal process
against doctor-researchers 3' and the promulgation of state statutes designed
to limit the types of research which may be under32
taken.

1 Id.

1' Two cases have commanded national attention: The Massachusetts "graverobbing" incident and the trial of Dr. Kenneth C. Edelin. See Boston Globe, Feb. 16, 1975,
at 1, col. 4.
The Massachusetts "grave-robbing" cases were triggered by a journal article written
by three Boston doctors. See Philipson, Sabath, & Charles, supra note 15. The article
described an experiment to determine which of two drugs reaches a fetus in sufficient
concentration to prevent congenital syphilis where the mothers are allergic to penicillin.
All of the women who participated in the experiment had requested abortions and had
provided their written consent to the research. The article came to the attention of the
Boston City Council and the Suffolk County District Attorney's Office. Indictments were
returned against the three doctors who wrote the article and a pathologist who assisted
them in the experiment. Boston Globe, Feb. 16, 1975, at 5, col. 1. The doctors were charged
with "grave-robbing" in violation of a state statute. Id. Their cases are still pending.
In the process of investigating the "grave-robbing" incident, a representative of the
Suffolk County District Attorney's Office found two dead fetuses in the county mortuary.
One was allegedly 24 weeks old; and a certificate listing the cause of its death could not
be located. Dr. Kenneth Edelin, the doctor who performed the abortion, was indicted for
the manslaughter of the aborted fetus. In his instructions to the jury, the judge stated that
a fetus is not a person until birth, that birth is defined as "the process which causes the
emergence of a new individual from the body of its mother," and that a person is one who
is born, that is, outside the body of the mother. Despite the fact that the only eyewitness
for the state testified that the fetus showed no sign of life when it was removed from the
mother, the jury convicted Dr. Edelin of manslaughter. Several of the jurors said their
guilty finding was based on the belief that Dr. Edelin was negligent in not attempting to
save the life of a premature infant while performing an abortion. A picture of the fetus
had a powerful effect in moving the jury toward conviction. Boston Globe, Feb. 16, 1975,
at 4, col. 6. On appeal the Massachusetts Supreme Court ordered a directed verdict for
aquittal. Commonwealth v. Edelin, 359 N.E.2d 4 (Mass. 1976).
32 There is a wide variation among states as to the limitations their statutes impose
on fetal experimentation. Certain statutes, for example, limit experimentation on ex utero
fetuses and yet fail to prohibit or regulate in utero experimentation. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 25956 (Supp. 1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-18 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1976); NEB. Ray. STAT. § 28-4,161 (1975). Other statutes impose a nearly universal ban
on fetal experimentation, excluding only those measures designed to preserve the life or
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The most pervasive regulation of fetal research, however, has
been at the national level. In July 1974, in response to research
on fetuses and other subjects who might lack the capacity to
consent, Congress passed the National Research Act. The act
applies to all federally funded fetal research" and provides for the
establishment of regulations governing the limits of permissible
research and the procedures to be followed in undertaking such
research.

As a preliminary step to the promulgation of regulations, the
act provided for the establishment of a National Commission for
the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral
Research. The Commission was assigned the responsibility of
studying the various kinds of research in progress, and reporting
its conclusions and recommendations regarding appropriate research and research protocols to the Secretary of the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare.3 7 In performing its initial assignment, the Commission held hearings and solicited the oral
and written views of experts from a broad range of disciplines.3
health of the aborted child. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.035 (Vernon, Cum. Supp.
1977); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-310, -311 (Supp. 1975).
Among the most comprehensive of the state statutes is that enacted by Massachusetts. It prohibits the use of live human fetuses, whether in utero or ex utero, as subjects
for scientific laboratory research, or other forms of experimentation. However, procedures
"incident to the study" of the fetus in utero are not prohibited if, in the physician's
judgment, the study will not "substantially jeopardize" the life of the fetus, and if the
fetus is not the subject of a planned abortion. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 12J (Supp.
1975). Diagnostic or remedial procedures to determine or preserve the life or health of the
fetus are specifically permitted. Id. For a more detailed analysis of several state fetal
research laws, see Note, Fetal Experimentation:Moral, Legal, and Medical Implications,
26 STAN. L. REv. 1191, 1197-207 (1975).
m National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348, tit. II, 88 Stat. 348 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as National Research Act]. See 120 CONG. Rac. S11,776 (daily ed. June 27, 1974);
119 CONG. Rzc. 29,213 (1973).
u 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (1976). As the federal government provides the money to
support a significant percentage of research pertaining to human subjects, and, as all
research on human subjects is required to conform to federal guidelines before funds are
provided, the federal regulations are of vital and far reaching importance.
National Research Act §§ 202, 205.
IId. § 201(b)(1). The members of the National Commission were selected and appointed by the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. When
finally constituted, the Commission consisted of three physicians with a knowledge of
research, two medical ethicists, three lawyers, two psychologists, and one public representative. FETAL RESEARCH RPOirr 33,530.
3, National Research Act § 202(b).
See FETAL REsEARCH REmORT 33,536-42.
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The legislative history of the enabling statute, pre-existing codes,
and other materials relating to research on the fetus were consulted, as were the draft rules and policy guidelines of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare." The final recommendations of the Commission were submitted to HEW and were
incorporated in large part into the regulations issued by the Department. 0
Following a definitional section," the Department's regulations provide for the establishment of two Ethical Advisory
Boards, one advisory to the Public Health Service and the other
advisory to all other agencies and components of the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare.4" The function of the boards
n
in

Id. at 33,531. The papers and reports submitted to the Commission are compiled

THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF

BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, RESEARCH ON THE

FETus:

HUmAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND
(1975). The Department's draft

APPENDIX

rules and policy guidelines emphasize informed consent and prior review as the principal
means for protecting human research subjects. They require an extra layering of committees to assess risk, monitor consent, and evaluate the ethical implications of particular
research. 39 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,653-54 (1974). See notes 190-244 and accompanying text
infra.
,* The regulations are found at 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.201-.301 (1976). While the regulations
and recommendations are similar in many respects, they differ on the question of whether
to permit research on a nonviable fetus ex utero which would alter its duration of life. The
Department concluded that the continuation of research to develop an artificial placenta
is in the public interest. See note 164 and accompanying text infra. In justifying its
decision to permit the research, the Department stated that it was "persuaded by the
weight of scientific evidence that research performed on the nonviable fetus ex utero has
contributed substantially to the ability of physicians to bring to viability increasingly
small fetuses." 40 Fed. Reg. 33,528 (1975). But see note 184 infra concerning the Department's proposed amendments to the regulations.
" 45 C.F.R. § 46.203 (1976). For the purposes of this article, the relevant definitional
sections are:
(c) "Fetus" means the product of conception from the time of implantation until a determination is made, following expulsion or extraction of the
fetus, that it is viable.
(d) "Viable" as it pertains to the fetus means being able, after either
spontaneous or induced delivery, to survive (given the benefit of available
medical therapy) to the point of independently maintaining heartbeat and
respiration . . . . If a fetus is viable after delivery, it is a premature infant.
(e) "Nonviable fetus" means a fetus ex utero which, although living,
is not viable.
(f) "Dead fetus" means a fetus ex utero which exhibits neither heartbeat, spontaneous respiratory activity, spontaneous movement of voluntary
muscles, nor pulsation of the umbilical cord (if still attached).
.

Id. § 46.204.
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is to render advice concerning the ethical issues present in those
classes of proposals which each board determines must be submitted to it.'" In addition, the regulations expand the functions
of Institutional Review Boards in local hospitals and similar institutions" in connection with activities involving fetuses, pregnant
women, or human in vitro fertilization. 5 No research award may
be made by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
until the appropriate reviewing bodies certify the research application. 6

General limitations are placed on all research activity. 7 Prior
to commencing fetal research, studies on animals and nonpregnant individuals are required. When nontherapeutic research is
conducted, the risk to the fetus must be minimal; if the research
is therapeutic and conducted on either the mother or the fetus,
the risk to the fetus must be the least possible consistent with
achieving the objectives of the research."
Finally, the regulations also place limits on specific areas of
research. These include provisions which relate to research activities directed toward pregnant women as subjects,4 activities involving the dead fetus, fetal material, or the placenta,m research
carried out in connection with abortion,5 in utero research, 5 and
experimentation on the nonviable fetus ex utero.53
Id. § 46.204(c), (d). The proposals potentially include any grant or contract sought
by the applicant for "supporting research, development, and related activities involving:
(1) The fetus, (2) pregnant women, and (3) human in vitro fertilization." Id. § 46.201(a).
11To obtain funding for research involving human subjects, an organization must
establish an Institutional Review Board whose function is to review and either approve or
disapprove research proposals. In addition, where the research involves risk to human
subjects, the Institutional Review Board must conduct continuing review throughout the
course of the project; insure that informed consent has been obtained; and determine that
the risks to the subject are outweighed both by the benefits to the subject and by the
knowledge to be gained through research. Id. § 46.102. See text accompanying notes 23240 infra.
' Id. § 46.205.
" Id. §§ 46.204(e), 46.205(b).
" Id. § 46.206.
Id. § 46.206(a)(I)-(2).
I' § 46.207.
Id.
Id. § 46.210.
" Id. § 46.206(a)(3)-(4).
s'Id. § 46.208.

" Id. § 46.209.
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II.

LEGAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE REGULATIONS

Scope of Analysis
The remainder of this article will analyze the legal issues
raised by sections 46.208 and 46.209 of the Department's regulations, i.e., research on the fetus in utero and on the fetus ex utero.
These sections of the regulations were chosen partly for reasons
of economy in an article of this length, and partly because the
most baffling problems are in the areas selected.54
Initially it may be helpful to clarify some important terms
which will be used throughout the analysis. The words fetal
experimentation or fetal research provide little clue to the complexity of the topic. Part of the problem is that we are considering
a "being" in different environments and stages of growth, and
A.

51Serious questions are also posed in those areas omitted from discussion. Research
on a premature infant (a fetus ex utero ascertained to be viable) is subject to the laws
and regulations governing research on children in general; but that area of the law is itself
unclear. The new regulation governing research on the dead fetus, fetal material, and the
placenta contains vexing definitional questions. It states that such research "shall be
conducted only in accordance with any applicable State or local laws regarding such
activities." 45 C.F.R. § 46.210 (1976). These statutes, however, leave open perplexing
questions. For example, the question of when death occurs, or perhaps, in the case of
fetuses, when life occurs, must be answered.
In the case of the fetus, it is not irreversible changes which preclude a return to normal
functioning that signal death, but an absence of adequate physiological development
which precludes the attainment of normal functioning. Conceptually, however, it is difficult to regard the time before "life" begins as death. For a discussion of this issue and an
analysis of state laws bearing on the issue of research on fetal tissue and remains, see
Capron,The Law Relating to Experimentation with the Fetus, in THE NATIONAL COMmISSION FOR THE PROTECTON OF HUMAN SuaJECTS OF BIoMmncAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH,
RESEARCH ON THE FETuS: APPENDIX (1975) [hereinafter cited as Capron Report].
In addition, research on the pregnant woman presents a plethora of problems, hardly
solved by the new regulations. By what calculus, for example, do we measure the degree
of therapeutic experimentation permissible on a mother which may cause harm to her
unborn child? The regulations bar nontherapeutic research on the mother except where
"the risk to the fetus is minimal."45 C.F.R. § 46.207(a)(2) (1976). But therapeutic research on the mother may be conducted in accordance with her wishes, id. § 46.207(b)(1),
with the sole limitation that the fetus be placed at risk to the minimum extent possible.
Id. § 46.207(a)(1). Thus the regulations may be a poor guide to doctor-researchers in
specific situations. What kind of risks are we talking about? Who measures the probability
of harm and magnitude of harm which may be inflicted? If an activity will meet the health
needs of the mother but will not provide significant benefit, and if the same activity
involves an immeasurable risk to the fetus, are we prepared to say that the research should
proceed? If doctors or hospitals refuse to proceed, are we prepared to absolve them from
liability if the health needs of the mother are neglected? Is a father's consent irrelevant if
he must share the burden of supporting a potentially defective offspring?
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these differences may be critically important in defining whether
that being has legal personhood. Thus one must distinguish carefully between fetuses in utero and ex utero and between fetuses
which are previable, nonviable, or viable. A fetus in utero before
the time of viability is previable, because it will in the normal
course of events grow into viability; on the other hand, a fetus ex
utero before the time of viability is nonviable, because, given the
current state of technological development, there is no way it will
attain viability.5 5 Similarly, a careful distinction must be made
between therapeutic and nontherapeutic experimentation., If the
objective is to benefit the subject, the experimentation is therapeutic; whereas if the main objective is to benefit others through
the acquisition of new knowledge, it is nontherapeutic. 7 Even the
word experimentationshould be defined. It refers to all nonstandard procedures utilized for diagnosis, therapy, or the acquisition
For a definition of viability see note 41 supra. In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a Missouri
statutory definition of viability as "that stage of fetal development when the life of the
unborn child may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial lifesupportive systems." Id. at 2831. For a discussion of the Department's minimum criteria
for viability see note 169 infra.
' Even the free substitution of words such as "experimentation," "research," "test,"
and the Department's more nebulous "activity" may be confusing. Experimentation, for
example, appears to have a more invidious connotation than the word research.
57

The objectives of experiments on human beings cover a wide spectrum, but may be classified roughly as therapeutic or nontherapeutic. Many
experiments are intended to benefit the subject (therapeutic experimentation). Frequently a doctor must treat a patient with an untried method
because no "accepted" treatment exists. A doctor may also use a new
method of treatment where other procedures are regarded as "standard practice," thinking that the new method will prove more beneficial to his patient
or be equally beneficial to his patient but lead to improved treatment for
other sufferers of similar disorders. On the other hand, many experiments
are not intended to benefit the subject (nontherapeutic experimentation),
but are conducted solely in the pursuit of new knowledge. The subject might
be a patient under a doctor's care for an unrelated ailment ... or he might
be a healthy volunteer. Different standards should govern therapeutic and
nontherapeutic experimentation. The therapeutic purpose itself serves to
justify a doctor's exposing a terminal leukemia patient to substantial risk in
an effort to prevent or postpone imminent death, while a stronger independent justification should be required for allowing a researcher to expose a
healthy volunteer to a similar risk simply to gain new knowledge.
Note, Experimentation on Human Beings, 20 STAN. L. REv. 99, 101 (1967). See also
Comment, Non-therapeutic Medical Research Involving Human Subjects, 24 SYaAcusE L.
REv. 1067, 1069 n.12 (1973). Cf. Karp v. Cooley, 349 F. Supp. 827 (S.D. Tex. 1972), afi'd,
493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845 (1974).
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of theretofore unknown information, and all standard procedures
performed for the same reasons but not in a context where such
procedures would be customary practice. 58
Lastly, in considering risk, it is important to assess the
probabilityof harm that may result from an experimental procedure. Is the likelihood one in one thousand, one in fifty, or
unknown? In the use of new therapies or the pursuit of new knowledge, physicians or medical researchers may have a general notion of risk; but the very newness of their activity may make a
precise calculation impossible. One should also assess the
magnitude of harm which may result. For example, is damage, if
it occurs, likely to be measured in terms of minor, transient injury
or life-long impairment of a vital organ?" The answer to this
question may depend partly upon a consideration of the interests
which are put at risk. Are we concerned with protecting "health,"
i.e., the physical, mental, or emotional well-being of the research
subject or other affected persons, or "human dignity"? 0 The latter concept, while nebulous in content, may be our paramount
concern; the concept relates not to tangible injury, but to the
preservation of values associated with individual human autonomy and worth.
B. Research on the Fetus In Utero
1. Legal Status of the Fetus In Utero
The first issue raised by the Department's regulation controlling in utero experimentation' does not go to the regulation itself
but to the rationale upon which it is based: What rights does a
fetus possess which entitle it to the protection afforded by the
regulations? This section will examine different areas of the law
which have dealt with the fetus in utero in an attempt to deter'62
mine when such a fetus acquires certain interests or "rights.
For another definition, see Martin, supra note 3, at 549.
For a discussion of this problem in another area, see Dershowitz, The Psychiatrist's
Power in Civil Commitment: A Knife that Cuts Both Ways, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Feb. 1969,
at 43-47.
See Martin, supra note 3, at 554-56.
*' The regulation is quoted in the text accompanying note 127 infra.
, For a more complete discussion of the rights of the fetus in utero in property,
criminal, and tort law, see Louisell, Abortion, the Practice of Medicine and the Due
Process of Law, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 233, 236-44 (1969).
"
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a. Property law
Anglo-American property law has long accorded the fetus
legal recognition. In an early English case, an unborn child was
held to be one of the "children living" at the time of the testator's
demise.6 3 Three years later, another English decision rebutted the
contention that a fetus is a nonentity:
Let us see, what this nonentity can do. He may be vouched in a
recovery, though it is for the purpose of making him answer over in
value. He may be an executor. He may take under the Statute of
Distributions. He may take by devise. He may be entitled under a
charge for raising portions. He may have an injunction; and he may
have a guardian."

American law followed the English lead. In 1834, Hall v.
Hancock" held that a grandchild born almost nine months after
the testator's death was a beneficiary under a bequest to such
grandchildren "as may be living at my death." Most states have
followed this Massachusetts opinion." Cases have held that a
devise of land vests in an unborn child prior to its birth,67 and that
a child may be an income recipient under a trust before birth. 8
The cases recognize, however, that the property rights of a
child in utero are not perfected until and unless the child is born
alive. 9
Doe v. Clarke, 2 H. Bl. 399, 126 Eng. Rep. 617 (C.P. 1795).
"4Thellusson v. Woodford, 4 Ves. Jun. 227, 331, 31 Eng. Rep. 117, 163 (Ch. 1798)
(citations omitted).
0 32 Mass. (15 Pick.) 255 (1834).
" See, e.g., Medlock v. Brown, 163 Ga. 520, 136 S.E. 551 (1927); Tomlin v. Laws, 301
Ill. 616, 134 N.E. 24 (1922); In re Estate of Walton, 183 Kan. 238, 326 P.2d 264 (1958); In
re Estate of Trattner, 394 Pa. 133, 145 A.2d 678 (1958); Guilliams v. Koonsman, 154 Tex.
401, 279 S.W.2d 579 (1955).
" Deal v. Sexton, 144 N.C. 157, 56 S.E. 691 (1907).
" Industrial Trust Co. v. Wilson, 61 R.I. 169, 200 A. 467 (1938).
11G. PATON, A TEXTBOOK OF JURISPRUDENcE 396 (4th ed. 1972). See also Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973). Liberal construction of fetal property interests apparently stems
from an attempt to carry out testator intent (the presumption being that a testator would
not wish to exclude any of his issue); but such intent is viewed as applying to live-born
children. This point of view is contested by Professor David Louisell, who argues that, in
the process of litigation, it is natural that the cases would be decided after a child has
been born, and that, under the circumstances, it is "superfluous" and "only dictum" for
courts to require a "live birth" in order to establish legal rights:
[S]uch decisions proceed more from a pragmatic sense of fairness and realism than from a philosophic conclusion of the existence in utero of autonomous human life. But this is only speculation. And whatever the motivation
for the decisions, they are clear-cut holdings that a child in gestation is a
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b.

Criminal law

Some legal scholars maintain that the common law refused
to recognize feticide as homicide unless the child was fully born 0
and then died as the result of the prenatal injuries." This is
disputed by others who believe that the early common law required not birth but quickening,12 or animation, for a fetus to be
protected by the laws against homicide." Whatever the early
English law, it is generally agreed that by the mid-seventeenth
century the common law had adopted the "born alive" theory.
Most American jurisdictions have followed the "born alive"
theory." Some state courts, however, have held that a fetus shall
human person, hence an autonomous legal entity capable of possessing property.
Louisell, supra note 62, at 237. The courts were not required to decide directly whether a
fetus in utero has all the rights of a born child. In some jurisdictions, however, the question
has been explicitly resolved by statute contrary to Professor Louisell's position. See CAL.
CIv. CODE § 29 (West 1954) ("in the event of its subsequent birth"); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 554.30 (West 1967) ("posthumous children"); N.Y. EST., POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW
§§ 2-1.3, 6-5.7 (McKinney 1967) ("posthumous children"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 15
(1972) ("in the event of its subsequent birth"); TEx. PRoB. CODE § 66 (1956) ("posthumous
children"). See also Capron Report, supra note 54, at 28 n.ll0.
70 "Fully born" means that the fetus is entirely separated from its mother, with an
entirely independent life, with the umbilical cord cut, and with its own breathing and
heart action. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 265 Ky. 295, 96 S.W.2d 1014 (Ct. App. 1936);
Morgan v. State, 148 Tenn. 417, 256 S.W. 433 (1923).
1' Clarke v. State, 117 Ala. 1, 23 So. 671 (1898); People v. Ryan, 9 Ill. 2d 467, 138
N.E.2d 516 (1956); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 265 Ky. 295, 96 S.W.2d 1014 (Ct. App.
1936); People v. Hayner, 300 N.Y. 171, 90 N.E.2d 23 (1949); Bennett v. State, 377 P.2d
634 (Wyo. 1963); R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 29 (2d ed. 1969); Means, The Law of New
York Concerning Abortion and the Status of the Foetus, 1664-1968: A Case of Cessation
of Constitutionality,14 N.Y.L.F. 411 (1968).
11 "Quickening" is the stage of development "when the motion of the fetus becomes
perceptible, usually about the middle of the period of pregnancy." State v. Patterson, 105
Kan. 9, 181 P. 609, 610 (1919).
11H. DE BRACTON, THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND, III, ii, 4, quoted and translated
in Means, supra note 71, at 419, presents a description of 13th century English law: "If
there be anyone who strikes a pregnant woman or gives her a poison whereby he causes
an abortion, if the foetus be already formed or animated, and especially if it be animated,
he commits homicide."
, If a woman be quick with childe, and by a potion or otherwise killeth
it in her wombe, or if a man beat her, whereby the childe dyeth in her body,
and she is delivered of a dead childe, this is a great misprision, and no
murder; but if the childe be born alive and dyeth of the potion, battery, or
other cause, this is murder; for in law it is accounted a reasonable creature,
in rerum natura, when it is born alive.
3 COKE, INSTITUTES 50 (1648), as quoted by Means, supra note 71, at 420.
,1 Singleton v. State, 33 Ala. App. 536, 35 So. 2d 375 (1948); People v. Ryan, 9 Ill. 2d
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be regarded as a human being for the purpose of homicide statutes when it has reached viability. 6 Several courts have required
only a showing of "quickening" in fetal manslaughter cases." A
number of others have extended the definition of "human being"
for the purposes
of manslaughter to include the fetus from the
"moment" 7 of conception. 7
c.

Tort law

Early American tort law, as exemplified by the language of
Justice Holmes in Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton,8 denied recovery for fetal injury on the ground that "the unborn child
was a part of the mother at the time of the injury."" Until World
War II, the Dietrich decision was followed universally. Courts
based their opinions on Justice Holmes' erroneous knowledge of
biology and on the difficult questions of causation involved in
linking tortious conduct to prenatal injury.
467, 138 N.E.2d 516 (1956); People v. Hayner, 300 N.Y. 171, 90 N.E.2d 23 (1949); Harris
v. State, 28 Tex. App. 308, 12 S.W. 1102 (1889); Bennett v. State, 377 P.2d 634 (Wyo.
1963). "'Person,' when referring to the victim of a homicide, means a human being who
has been born and is alive." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05(1) (McKinney 1975).
" See People v. Chavez, 77 Cal. App. 2d 621, 176 P.2d 92 (1947). But see Keeler v.
Superior Court of Amador County, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970).
71 Evans v. People, 49 N.Y. 86 (1872); Foster v. State, 182 Wis. 298, 196 N.W. 233
(1923).
"1
'"[Mloment of conception' is a figment of the imagination, since conception like
everything else is a process which takes time." Williams, The Legalization of Medical
Abortion, THE EuGEoics REviEw, Apr. 1964, at 19, 21, cited by Brodie, The New Biology
and the PrenatalChild, 9 J. FAm. LAW 391 n.2 (1970). Also, "conception is a 'process' over
time, rather than an event." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 161 (1973) (citing a number of
"new biology" articles).
11 State v. Elliott, 206 Ore. 82, 289 P.2d 1075 (1955); State v. Atwood, 54 Ore. 526,
102 P. 295, aff'd on rehearing, 54 Ore. 526, 104 P. 195 (1909).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), will now, presumably, protect a physician from a
charge of murder or manslaughter where the fetus dies in utero as a necessary result of
abortion. See text accompanying notes 111-23 infra for a discussion of Roe v. Wade. The
recent resolution in the case of Commonwealth v. Edelin, 359 N.E.2d 4 (Mass. 1976),
reaffirms this conclusion. Freedom from a charge of homicide is more problematical in the
experimentation context where a physician, not knowing the lethal effects of his experiment, injures a fetus which dies as a result. Capron Report, supra note 54, at 17.
The impact of Roe is completely unclear in more generalized situations involving
homicide, as in the case of a man who fatally injures a fetus while beating a woman.
Boston Globe, Oct. 3, 1975, at 16, col. 1. Depending on the wording of the applicable state
statute, a charge might be brought whether the fetus dies before or after birth.
138 Mass. 14 (1884).
11Id. at 17.
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In 1946, in Bonbrest v. Kotz, S1 a federal district court rejected
the rationale and conclusion of Dietrich and declared that injuries to a viable unborn child were compensable in an action by
the child after birth. The Minnesota Supreme Court extended
this reasoning soon afterward, holding that a personal representative could maintain a wrongful death action for fetal injuries to a
viable fetus. 3 Other courts quickly followed this trend, leading to
"the most spectacular abrupt reversal of a well settled rule in the
whole history of the law of torts." 4 Today, virtually every American jurisdiction permits recovery in tort for prenatal injuries.8 5
Differences still exist, however, in the requirements for actions by
a surviving child and actions under wrongful death statutes; consequently, each area will be explored separately."8
1. Action for prenatal injuries by a surviving child
Since such a claim is brought by the child himself, it is
apparent that the tortfeasor's liability is prospective, contingent
on the unborn child's live birth. 7 Thus, a child who suffers nonfatal prenatal injuries, but who dies in utero before birth from
independent causes, cannot maintain an action for those injuries." The status of the unborn child in respect to its right of
recovery is not that of a legal person capable of asserting an
independent right, but that of a separate living entity having a
potentiality of legal personhood not fully recognized until birth.
A number of courts have implied that recovery for prenatal
injuries is limited to cases where the alleged injury occurred at a
viable stage of gestation." The principal rationale for this requirement is the difficulty in proving that a defendant's actions were
the proximate cause of the child's previable injuries. However,
2 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).

Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 336 (4th ed. 1971).
Id. at 337.

Cf. La Blue v. Specker, 358 Mich. 558, 100 N.W.2d 445 (1960) (holding that the
unborn fetus is a "child" and a "person" entitled to bring an action for a parent's death
prior to the child's birth).
11Leccese v. McDonough, 361 Mass. 64, 68 n.4, 279 N.E.2d 339, 342 n.4 (1972); Keyes
v. Construction Serv., Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960).
" See, e.g., the hypothetical case posed in Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co., 341 F.2d
75, 80 n.9 (4th Cir. 1964) (Haynsworth, J., dissenting).
' Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962); Mallison v. Pomeroy, 205 Ore.
690, 291 P.2d 225 (1955).
'3
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the viability requirement has been widely criticized as arbitrary
and unsatisfactory in limiting a potential tortfeasor's duty of
care. Prosser has argued that compensation for prenatal injuries
should not hinge on the stage of fetal development at the time of
the injury, since the child sustains the same harm after birth
regardless of the time when the injury occurs. 0 In accord with
Prosser's view, the current trend has been to eliminate the viability requirement in actions for prenatal injuries." Most jurisdictions which have recently ruled on the issue allow recovery for
prenatal injuries even if the injury occurs early in pregnancy,
before either viability or quickening.2
2.

Action for wrongful death

A wrongful death action may be brought in cases where a
child does not survive to assert a claim. Neither the difficulty in
assessing appropriate damages nor the difficulty in proving causation has been deemed sufficient to bar the action. But while
every state permits recovery for wrongful death, 3 there is sharp
disagreement with respect to whether a live birth is required in
order to maintain a wrongful death action. Courts in several jurisdictions require it, maintaining that there has been no harm to a
"person" until the fetus is born alive.94
Arrayed against these authorities are more than a score of
W. PROSSER, supra note 84, at 337-38.
Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (1939) (statutory construction); Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956) (fetus 6
weeks old at time of injury); Daley v. Meier, 33 IIl. App. 2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1961);
Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. App. 1923) (statutory construction); Torigian v.
Watertown News Co., 352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967) (fetus 3 1/2 months at time
of injury and 5 3/4 months at birth can recover although it died 2 1/2 hours after birth);
Womack v. Buchhorn, 384 Mich. 718, 187 N.W.2d 218 (1971) (injury to fetus at 4 months);
Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353,
157 A.2d 497 (1960); Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953), appeal
granted, 283 App. Div. 914, 129 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1954) (fetus 3 months at time of injury);
Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960) (fetus I month at time of injury); Sylvia
v. Gobeille, 220 A.2d 222 (R.I. 1966); Yandell v. Delgado, 471 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1971).
32 W. PRossE,
supra note 84, at 337 n.31, lists seven jurisdictions (California, Georgia, Louisiana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island) as having
expressly discarded the viability and quickening requirements.
Ild. at 337.
" Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (1954); Drabbels v. Skelly
Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140
(1964); Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9 (1964); Durrett v. Owens, 212 Tenn. 614,
371 S.W.2d 433 (1963).
"
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jurisdictions which permit an action for the wrongful death of a
viable fetus regardless of whether it is born alive. 5 One state,
Georgia, permits such an action for children injured when not yet
viable but only "quick.""6 In order to permit recovery in these
cases, courts have held that the unborn fetus is a "person" or
"minor child" as a matter of statutory construction. In a recent
case regarding the fetus' statutory status, Eich v. Town of Gulf
Shores,97 the Alabama Supreme Court declared:
We recognize the cases cited by appellee construing the term "minor
child" as not including a fetus, but are not persuaded that such a
strict construction here would insure the necessary growth of the law
in this vital area and the individual justice of the case before us.9

The court held that the purpose of the Alabama wrongful death
statute was to preserve human life, and that therefore a live birth
was not a prerequisite to liability. 9 The court criticized the "live
birth" requirement as being illogical, since under such a standard
a tortfeasor's liability depends not on the seriousness of his
wrongful conduct, but on whether the injured child is able to
survive his injuries for at least a moment after birth. A wrongdoer
00
is thus rewarded if his conduct kills a fetus immediately.
15Simmons v. Howard Univ., 323 F. Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1971); Eich v. Town of Gulf
Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So. 2d 354 (1974); Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358,
224 A.2d 406 (1966); Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557 (Super.
Ct. 1956); Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955); Chrisafogeorgis v.
Brandenberg, 55 Ill. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973); Britt v. Sears, 150 Ind. App. 487, 277
N.E.2d 20 (Ct. App. 1971); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955); Valence v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 So. 2d 847 (La. Ct. App. 1951); State ex rel. Odham v.
Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964); O'Neill v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 188 N.W.2d
785 (1971); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949); Rainey v. Horn,
221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954); White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 458 P.2d 617 (1969);
Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio
App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959); Libbee v. Permanente Clinic, 268 Ore. 258, 518 P.2d
636 (1974); Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964); Baldwin v. Butcher,
184 S.E.2d 428 (W. Va. 1971); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d
14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967).
" Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955).
'7 293 Ala. 95, 300 So. 2d 354 (1974).
* Id. at 98, 300 So. 2d at 356 (footnote omitted).
"Id.
Ild. at 97, 99, 300 So. 2d at 355, 357. The Illinois Supreme Court was persuaded to
eliminate the "live birth" standard for wrongful death actions on this same rationale.
Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 I1. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1974). In denying fetal
"personhood" in Roe v. Wade, Justice Blackmun attempted to reconcile his position with
the fact that so many jurisdictions regarded the unborn fetus as a "person" under their
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d. Welfare law
Until recently, another context in which the law appeared to
be in conflict with respect to fetal status was in the definition of
a "dependent child" in the Federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. 0 The statutory interpretation of
"dependent child' ' 02 had caused much confusion in the courts,

because nowhere in the statute was there mention of the unborn.
The statute referred simply to needy children "under the age of
eighteen." HEW regulations 0 3 made matching funds available to
the unborn, but the regulations were not mandatory, and the
Department had approved state plans which made funds available to the unborn as well as plans which did not.'0 '
Four out of five federal courts of appeals which have recently
considered this issue concluded that an unborn child qualified as
a "dependent child" under the Social Security Act, and that a
pregnant woman was, therefore, eligible to obtain AFDC benefits
prior to her child's birth. 05 The Fifth Circuit, for example, dewrongful death statutes. Permitting parents to recover in tort for the wrongful death of
their fetus, he asserted, is not based on the theory that the unborn child is a person in
the full sense, but rather is designed to vindicate the parents' interest in the potentiality
of human life. 410 U.S. at 162. Blackmun's view is difficult to reconcile with the fact that
the wrongful death statutes are not framed in terms of "potential children." In construing
the statutes, the courts have struggled to determine whether legislatures intended to
include the fetus in the class of "persons" covered by the statutes. Moreover, it does not
disprove legal personhood to say that a wrongful death suit for an unborn fetus is designed
only to vindicate parental interests, since a wrongful death action always vindicates the
interests of the family of the deceased. The fact that parents may recover in tort for the
wrongful death of their child in no way diminishes the legal personhood of children.
In Great Britain the recent Law Commission Report on Injuries to Unborn Children
considered the question of when parents may bring an action "for loss of their unborn
child." The Commission recommended that such an action should be barred unless the
fetus survives for at least 48 hours after delivery. Even before presentation of the Report
to Parliament the 48-hour requirement was criticized as being illogical, partly on the
ground that it might encourage doctors to take extraordinary measures to keep a fetus
alive merely to satisfy a technical requirement. The Times (London), Sept. 12, 1975, at
14, col. 1. All attempts at line drawing ignore the fact that biological development lies on
a continuum.
" See Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975). For a detailed analysis of this subject
see, Note, Eligibilityof the Unborn for AFDC Benefits: The Statutory and Constitutional
Issues, 54 B.U.L. Rv.945 (1974).
10 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970) (a statutory definition of "dependent child" for the
purposes of the Social Security Act).
"0 45 C.F.R. §§ 233.90(c)(2)(ii), (c)(3) (1976).
' See Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 579-80 n.5 (1975).
' The First, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits had upheld fetal eligibility prior to
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clared that "[a]n unborn child's lack of status as a 'person' for
Fourteenth Amendment purposes does not affect the status of an
unborn child as a 'child' within the language of the Act. . . .
The Seventh Circuit based its finding of eligibility on the administrative practices of the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare and its predecessors, which had permitted prenatal benefit payments since 1941.107
The Supreme Court held, however, that it was not mandatory for states receiving federal assistance under AFDC to provide
benefits to pregnant women, since the unborn child did not qualify as a "dependent child" as defined by the Social Security
0 Because the Court based its holding
Act. 1°
on statutory construction, it expressly reserved the question of whether HEW has the
statutory authority to approve federal participation in state programs which elect to continue payments for unborn children. 01
Had the Court concluded that the unborn were indeed dependent
children, it would have faced a serious equal protection issue in
those states which excluded the unborn from coverage." 0
e.

Roe v. Wade

Although the trend prior to 1973 appeared to be in the direction of expanding legal recognition of fetal interests, in that year
the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade,"' the landmark decision in the area of abortion. The Court held that a woman's right
Burns v. Alcala. Carver v. Hooker, 501 F.2d 1244 (1st Cir. 1974), vacated, 420 U.S. 1000
(1975); Doe v. Lukhard, 363 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd, 493 F.2d 54 (4th Cir.
1974), vacated, 420 U.S. 999 (1975); Parks v. Harden, 504 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1974),
vacated, 421 U.S. 926 (1975); Wilson v. Weaver, 499 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1974), vacated,
420 U.S. 999 (1975). The above decisions were all vacated as a result of Burns v. Alcala.
The Second Circuit denied fetal eligibility. Wisdom v. Norton, 507 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1974).
Parks v. Harden, 504 F.2d 861, 864 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated, 421 U.S. 926 (1975).
"
Wilson v. Weaver, 499 F.2d 155, 157-58 (7th Cir. 1974), vacated, 420 U.S. 999
(1975).
' Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975).
10 In Wisdom v. Norton, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals declared that the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare exceeded its statutory authority in permitting states to confer AFDC benefits upon the unborn child. 507 F.2d 750, 755 (2d Cir.
1974). In Burns v. Alcala, however, the Supreme Court refrained from determining
whether HEW exceeded its statutory authority. 420 U.S. at 586.
"' Such a holding would have enunciated a view of fetal personhood inconsistent with
its holding in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
" Id. The Court further explicated its position on a woman's constitutional rights to
abortion in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976) and Bellotti v. Baird,
96 S. Ct. 2857 (1976).
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of privacy is protected by the fourteenth amendment,"' that the
decision to have an abortion falls within this right,"' and that the
right to an abortion is fundamental and can only be subject to
regulation when there is a compelling state interest.' The state
has two legitimate interests: maternal health and the protection
of the potentiality of human life." 5 Each interest acquires increasingly greater significance as the fetus develops during pregnancy.
This maturing of significance permits limited state regulation to
foster maternal health during the second trimester and provides
the state with a compelling interest in proscribing abortion in
order to protect the potentiality of human life during the third
trimester or after viability, except where an abortion is necessary
to protect the health of the mother. '
With respect to fetal rights, what did Roe decide? The Court
held that "the word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn."'1 7 A fetus in utero therefore
enjoys no fourteenth amendment rights and, in all probability, no
other constitutionalrights until after birth, since the Court's constitutional analysis was not limited to the fourteenth amendment."' A state may choose not to restrict abortions even after
viability; and a fetus has no constitutional right to object, despite
the harm that might occur." '
"

410 U.S. at 153.

113 Id.

Id. at 155, 163.
,, Id. at 162.
,, Id. at 162-65.
Id. at 158.
"' Id. at 157. It is unlikely that the Court would be so inconsistent as to deem the
fetus a nonperson for purposes of abortion and a person for other purposes.
"I Although Roe may appear to some to be the logical and ultimate extension of the
Court's concern for privacy in matters of sexual conduct enunciated in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), it has not gone
without detractors. Professor John Ely, criticizing the decision as an unjustifiable extension of the constitutionally protected right to privacy and as court-made legislation, said:
What is frightening about Roe is that this super-protected right [a woman's
freedom to choose an abortion] is not inferable from the language of the
Constitution, the framers' thinking respecting the specific problem in issue,
any general rules derivable from the provisions they included, or the nation's
governmental structure.
Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 935-36
(1973).
Certainly the Court in Roe has substantially expanded the notion of privacy. It is one
thing to protect the privacy of the home and of those intimate sexual activities between
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Although Roe held that the fetus is not a person in the fourteenth amendment sense, this decision does not necessarily mean
that the fetus is not entitled to protection. As Roe acknowledged,
the state has an "important and legitimate interest in protecting
the potentiality of human life."' 2 Whether a previable or viable
fetus, as a potential human life, should be accorded protection
should depend on a balancing of the interests asserted in a particular context, and those interests may differ in situations other
than abortion.
When the mother's fundamental right to privacy is involved,
the state may regulate only when its interest is compelling. Roe
held that the state's interest in protecting the potentiality of
2
human life becomes compelling when the fetus reaches viability '
(during the third trimester of gestation); thereafter, the mother's
fundamental privacy right to abortion can be subordinated to the
state's interest in protecting the viable fetus, except where the
22
mother's life or health is endangered.
However, Roe leaves unanswered the question of the scope of
the mother's fundamental privacy right. The decision might be
husband and wife which take place within the home. It is another thing, however, to
expand the concept of privacy in its sexual sense to abortion-to confer a privacy right in
the reproductive sphere after conception, within the first trimester of pregnancy and
essentially within the second as well.
The result in Roe v. Wade, but not its legal reasoning, has been defended. Tribe, The
Supreme Court 1972 Term, Forward:Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life

and Law, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1, 15-32 (1973). Professor Tribe argues that the question of
"when life begins" has become an essentially religious issue, not resolvable by resort to
the slippery slope of biological development, and that if governmental decisions are based
on the pervasive interference of religious groups in legislative considerations, the establishment clause must be invoked unless there are compelling, wholly secular reasons for
the legislation. As in Roe v. Wade, Tribe asserts that the government may intervene only
after viability, because only at that point in time is the fetus in the same status as an
infant for the secular purpose of protecting it from infanticide.
'" 410 U.S. at 162. See note 114 and accompanying text supra. The potentiality
concept is inapposite, however, to protection of the nonviable fetus which, by definition,
is physiologically incapable of attaining viability. See notes 141-42 infra. Nevertheless, the
nonviable fetus may be entitled to protection based on a fundamental "dignity" concept:
The fetus, simply because it is a member of the human family, must be accorded certain
considerations. See note 135 infra. See also note 100 supra.
12,410 U.S. at 163. The Court defined "viability" as that point of development at
which the fetus is "potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial
aid." Id. at 160. The Court added: "Viability is usually placed at about seven months (28
weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks." Id.
'" See note 116 supra.
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interpreted to confer on the mother an unfettered right to do what
she pleases with her fetus until the third trimester, but it can also
be narrowly construed as a determination of the respective rights
of mother and fetus only in the context of abortion. While Roe
acknowledges a mother's fundamental right to terminate her
pregnancy,'2 it does not expressly grant a right to manipulate
fetal existence in any other context; nor does it expressly grant
the mother a right to consent to in utero experimentation.
If the mother's privacy right in Roe is broadly construed to
encompass absolute control over the fetus in the first two trimesters, the state might nevertheless assert a compelling interest in
protecting the potentiality of life at a point earlier than viability
when a procedure such as nontherapeutic experimentation,
rather than abortion, is planned. And if Roe is strictly construed
to apply only to abortion, then there is no precedent to assume
the mother's fundamental privacy right includes fetal experimentation, and state regulation to protect the fetus' potentiality for
a full life need not be justified by a compelling interest. The state
would merely have to demonstrate a rational basis for the assertion of its interest. Thus, even though Roe deems the fetus a
nonperson for constitutional purposes, it may nevertheless be entitled to protection where the state demonstrates a compelling
interest in the potentiality of life in the nonabortion context, or
where the fundamental rights of the mother are not at issue.
A somewhat analogous situation arises in cases involving the
state's power to restrict experimentation on animals. Animals,
like the fetus, enjoy no constitutional rights. 2' Yet a rational
basis for the statutes banning cruelty to animals 25 in most, if not
all, states can be found in the dehumanizing and brutalizing
effect on society of needless cruelty inflicted on helpless creatures. These statutes, attacked as unconstitutional takings of
123That the constitutionai right of privacy encompasses a woman's right to obtain an
abortion is difficult to square with cases holding that a person has no absolute right to
bodily privacy. E.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 787 (1966) (involuntary blood test
for criminal evidence); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (involuntary sterilization); Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (compulsory vaccination). See also note 128
infra.
"1, Massachusetts S.P.C.A. v. Commissioner of Pub. Health, 339 Mass. 216, 158
N.E.2d 487 (1959).
125See, e.g., ILL. ANNOT. STAT. ch. 8, § 704 (1975); IOWA CODE ANN. § 717.3 (1946);
MASS P-N. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 77 (Supp. 1976).
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property without due process of law, have been upheld as a legiti2
mate exercise of the police power to protect public morality. If
a state or the federal government may regulate animal research,
it surely may regulate fetal research to protect the potentiality of
human life; and it is inconceivable that the protection accorded
to the fetus, even when balanced against the interests of society
in the results of fetal experimentation, would not be greater than
those accorded to animal research subjects.
2.

Regulation of Research on the Fetus In Utero

Section 46.208 of the Department's regulations addresses
activities directed toward fetuses in utero as subjects.
(a) No fetus in utero may be involved as a subject in any
activity covered by this subpart unless: (1) The purpose of the activity is to meet the health needs of the particular fetus and the fetus
will be placed at risk only to the minimum extent necessary to meet
such needs, or (2) the risk to the fetus imposed by the research is
minimal and the purpose of the activity is the development of important biomedical knowledge which cannot be obtained by other
means.'1

One example of research addressed by this section of the
regulations is the development of a perfected fetoscope for the
diagnosis and amelioration of fetal diseases and defects. Other
examples include detection of fetal breathing through ultrasound,
fetal heartbeat through electrocardiogram, and fetal vision
through light shined transabdominally. The administration of
certain drugs to the mother in an effort to determine whether they
will cross the placenta and provide therapy to the fetus before
birth would also be covered by this section. Some of these procedures involve only minimal violation of bodily integrity and appear to pose little risk. With other procedures, however, the hazards of research are incalculable; and the decision to use the
'
Burr, Toward Legal Rights for Animals, 4 ENv. AF. 205, 207 (1975). Of course, as
might be expected, in a genuine collision of animal and human interests, the interests of
animals have been forced to give way. The Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-55
(1970), provides protection for most warm-blooded animals in terms of requirements such
as adequate housing, ample food and water, and decent sanitation. But the act in no way
authorizes "disruption or interference with scientific research or experimentation." Similarly, states assign animals quite limited rights in the area of research, barring only
"unnecessary" infliction of pain, but permitting the use of animals for "the testing of

drugs or medicines." See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws
1v 45 C.F.R. § 46.208 (1976).

ANN.

ch. 49A, § 2 (1968).
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research technique may depend on the anticipated benefit to the
fetus.
Despite its sound legal foundation, the regulation raises serious questions because of its (perhaps deliberate) imprecision of
language. This imprecision may lead to two situations where possibly unintended results could occur. One situation involves the
requirement of consent by both parents before physicians may
render even a life-saving, therapeutic, but experimental treatment to their unborn fetus. Apparently therapeutic care may be
withheld if either parent objects. Were this situation to arise with
respect to a child, however, it is entirely possible that upon petition a court would intervene, declare the child neglected, and
order the treatment under its parens patriae power. 2 " It is not
clear, however, that a court would, or could, intervene if it finds
the fetus is not a human person equivalent to a child. The regulation could have been drafted to provide an exception to parental
consent in cases of serious, possibly life-threatening illness or
injury, although the draftsmen may have believed that a judicially applied common law or statutory remedy would still be
available.
There is also reason for concern, in the case of nontherapeutic
research, with the requirement that the risk be "minimal." If a
procedure is truly experimental, the degree of risk is definitionally unascertainable. Moreover, the word "minimal" disguises
the measurement to be used; does it refer to the likelihood of
injury, the magnitude of injury, or both? Many would regard even
the possibility of minor injury as unacceptable and unnecessary
I In a case decided before Roe v. Wade, the New Jersey Supreme Court required that
a pregnant woman obtain blood transfusions necessary to save the life of her unborn fetus.
The woman had refused the transfusions on religious grounds. (She was a Jehovah's
Witness.) The court stated:
We are satisfied that the unborn child is entitled to the law's protection and
that an appropriate order should be made to ensure blood transfusions to the
mother in the event that they are necessary in the opinion of the physicians
in charge at the time.
Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 422, 201 A.2d 537, 538,
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964). This holding is not necessarily foreclosed by Roe v.
Wade, since it involved compulsory prenatal medical care for a "viable" fetus. Since the
state may assert a "compelling interest" in the potential life of the fetus during the third
trimester of pregnancy, it may arguably require a pregnant woman to obtain certain types
of therapeutic care, despite the fact that this requirement might impinge on
"fundamental" privacy and religious rights.
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when the fetus will receive no benefit, even though others might
characterize the risk in such a case as minimal.
More importantly, particularly from a substantive point of
view, the notion of what constitutes minimal risk may vary depending on whether or not a fetus will be aborted.'1' Because the
regulations'30 are not clear on this point, the contention may be
raised that a previable fetus is incapable of being subject to risk,
because it will necessarily die following abortion. In addition, if
it is scheduled to die by techniques which will mutilate it in any
event,' 3' why be squeamish about conducting research which may
result in lesser degrees of harm?
There are several responses to this assertion. For example, it
may be argued that the decision to abort involves the taking of a
life. Even if, as a pragmatic matter, that taking is permissible
under the law, our instincts should be to preserve and protect life
whenever possible.' 32 Therefore, no undue influence should be
imposed upon a woman to abort. 133 Experimentation, if it involves
'" There are very valid reasons for conducting fetal research, and it makes good
research sense to use a fetus scheduled for abortion in a potentially hazardous but valuable
experiment, e.g., in studies concerning drug transfer across the placenta. See note 19 and
accompanying text supra.
'3 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.206(2), (4) (1976).
' During the first 12 weeks, or first trimester, of pregnancy, both dilation and currettage ("D and C") and vacuum currettage procedures are employed for abortion. The
former involves widening the mouth of the cervix and scraping and emptying the uterus
manually. The latter involves the use of a vacuum-powered device to scrape the fetus,
placenta, and amniotic sac from the uterine wall, homogenize them, and suck them out
of the uterus. Interview with James H. Staton, Executive Director of the Boston Hospital
for Women, in Boston, Feb. 19, 1975.
Abortions are generally not performed from the twelfth through the sixteenth week
of pregnancy, but between sixteen and twenty weeks, two methods are used: Injection of
saline solution into the uterus, or intravenous injection of the drug prostaglandin. In
almost all cases, a saline abortion kills the fetus, often deforming it hideously. Interview
with Dr. David Nathan, Professor of Pediatrics, Harvard Medical School, Children's
Hospital Medical Center, Boston, Mass., in Boston, Feb. 13,1975. Prostaglandin may not
kill the fetus, but at least 90% of the fetuses aborted by this method are born dead. If a
fetus shows some signs of life-a determination made by the delivering physician-it
generally dies within minutes, or at most a few hours. Boston Globe, Feb. 13, 1975, at 3,
col. 1.
If these methods do not induce an abortion of the fetus, a hysterotomy, or little
Caesarian, is performed. This is a surgical procedure in which the fetus is removed intact
from the uterus, and it may be the procedure of choice for pregnancies between 20 and 24
weeks. This method poses the smallest health risk to the fetus and the greatest risk to
the pregnant woman. Id.
13' FETAL RESEARCH REPor, supra note 19, at 33,539.
' Statement by R. Wasserstrom, id. at 33,540.
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a potential hazard of deforming the fetus, will compromise the
mother's choice of whether to carry it to full term, since once the
decision has been made to have an abortion, subsequent experimentation may preclude the mother from reconsidering that decision.134
More important than the rather utilitarian argument on
withdrawal of consent is the contention that nontherapeutic experimentation on a fetus in utero involves an assault on the dignity of a potential human being. 135 Until abortion actually occurs,
the fetus scheduled for abortion should be treated no differently
than the fetus carried to full term. 36 Professor Louisell, in his
dissent to the Commission's recommendations, states: "The argument that the fetus-to-be-aborted 'will die anyway' proves too
much. All of us 'will die anyway." ' 37 We should not subject a
terminally ill cancer patient to potentially harmful nontherapeutic experimentation simply because the person lacks what most
of the rest of us have-an unascertainably long and full future
life. Arguably, we should do the same for a fetus, whether or not
it has full status as a person.
C.

Research on the Nonviable Fetus Ex Utero

The regulation governing research on fetuses ex utero, including nonviable fetuses, provides that:
I"A similar withdrawal of consent problem exists in adoptions of newborn children.
Frequently a mother, who before giving birth has consented to surrender her child for
adoption, wishes to withdraw that consent upon or shortly after birth. To cope with this
problem,
[a] number of states have statutes which declare invalid any consent executed by a mother before the birth of the child . . . . [Tihe British Adoption Act of 1958. . .absolutely voids any consent unless the infant is at least
six weeks old on the date of the execution of the document.
C. FOOTE, R. LEVY, & F. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 480 (1966).
lu Prior to the abortion of the fetus, its protection may be justified on two grounds:
First, its potentiality for human existence; and, second, because it should be afforded a
measure of human dignity. The term "dignity," as used here, encapsules those pragmatic,
theological, and metaphysical considerations which give worth and value to human existence; it relates to the notion that the fetus is entitled to respect simply because it is a
member of the human family.
I" Once abortion occurs, however, the potentiality of continued existence is terminated and can no longer serve as the basis for protection of fetal rights. The fetus should
then be treated, with respect to experimentation, like other nonviable fetuses and accorded a measure of dignity, and, hence, protection. See notes 138-84 and accompanying
text infra.
"I FErAL RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 19, at 33,549 (dissent by D. Louisell).
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(a) No fetus ex utero may be involved as a subject in an activity covered by this subpart until it has been ascertained whether the
particular fetus is viable, unless: (1) There will be no added risk to
the fetus resulting from the activity, and (2) the purpose of the
activity is the development of important biomedical knowledge
which cannot be obtained by other means.
(b) No nonviable fetus may be involved as a subject in an
activity covered by this subpart unless: (1) Vital functions of the
fetus will not be artificially maintained except where the purpose of
the activity is to develop new methods for enabling fetuses to survive
to the point of viability, (2) experimental activities which of themselves would terminate the heartbeat or respiration of the fetus will
not be employed, and (3) the purpose of the activity is the development of important biomedical knowledge which cannot be obtained
by other means.3

The regulation prohibits any research which may subject a fetus
ex utero to additional risks until it has been ascertained whether
that fetus is viable. If a fetus is found to be viable, it must be
treated as a premature infant.' If, however, the fetus ex utero is
found to be nonviable, it may be the subject of research to further
the development of important biomedical knowledge which cannot be obtained by other means.'4 0
In 45 C.F.R. § 46.209 (1976). HEW has received criticism of the concept of viability
as it applies to the fetus ex utero. The Department noted, in response, that both it and
the Commission were aware of the medical uncertainty inherent in the term "viability"
and that, therefore, the regulations defining a viable fetus used very conservative criteria
to insure against medical error in determining viability. Consequently, HEW proposed no
changes in the use of the terms "viability" or "fetus ex utero." 42 Fed. Reg. 2792 (1977).
1" 45 C.F.R. § 46.203(d) (1976). The regulation specifies that "[i]f a fetus is viable
after delivery, it is a premature infant." Once a fetus attains the status of a premature
infant, a legal duty of care arises for both the attending physician and the parents.
Generally this duty requires that life-saving therapeutic assistance be rendered so that the
premature infant will have the opportunity to survive. For a discussion of this legal duty
of care in related areas see Robertson, note 186 infra; Paulsen, supra note 4.
"' The permissible risk associated with such research is not clear. The regulations
contain a general provision requiring minimal risk in activities unrelated to fetal health
needs. 45 C.F.R. § 46.206(2) (1976). This standard is imprecise and difficult to apply even
to fetal experimentation generally. See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra. In the
unique situation of the nonviable fetus which cannot be "harmed for life," however,
minimal risk may be a meaningless proposition. See text accompanying note 159 infra.
Perhaps for this reason, the regulations pertaining to the nonviable fetus omit any reference to risk, 45 C.F.R. § 46.209, in contrast to the provisions regulating research on the
fetus in utero where the concept of minimal risk is expressly included, id. § 46.208(a).
The difficulty of defining permissible risk for the fetus ex utero raises a potential
problem in the application of the Department's waiver provisions. The regulations provide
that the Secretary may modify or waive specific limitations on fetal research after considering:
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1. Rights of the Nonviable Fetus
Obviously, the critical distinction in the regulations is between those ex utero fetuses which are viable and those which are
not. The regulations define viability as "being able, after either
spontaneous or induced delivery, to survive (given the benefit of
available medical therapy) to the point of independently maintaining heartbeat and respiration."'' A lack of viability does not,
however, mean that the fetus is already dead.' The nonviable
fetus ex utero is similar to any other being which, having lost a
vital function, must necessarily die. But, while a nonviable fetus
is a fortiori dying and has no potentiality for continued life, it
may be regarded as a living person for the duration of its short
existence. Is there, then, any scientific or moral justification for
conferring fewer of the rights of humanity on the nonviable fetus
than are required for the viable fetus? Is the distinction made in
the regulations a tenable one?
a. Legal precedent
Legal source materials are of little help in answering this
question. While many courts and commentators have struggled
to define the status of the fetus in utero, there is a curious void
in considering the status of beings born prior to the stage of viability. In tort and homicide cases, for example, most courts will
confer human status on an infant who is born alive, without apparent regard to whether the infant is viable or nonviable. 4 3 The
whether the risks to the subject are so outweighed by the sum of the benefit
to the subject and the importance of the knowledge to be gained as to warrant such modification or waiver and that such benefits cannot be gained
except through a modification or waiver.
Id. § 46.211. Approval by both an Institutional Review Board and an Ethical Advisory
Board is required. Despite this significant safeguard, if risk is, in fact, seen as a meaningless concept in the context of research on the fetus ex utero, the waiver provisions might
give rise to potentially degrading forms of research on such fetuses, a result which the
promulgation of the regulations was originally intended to prevent.
"' 45 C.F.R. § 46.203(d) (1976).
1
The regulations define a dead fetus as one "which exhibits neither heartbeat,
spontaneous respiratory activity, spontaneous movement of voluntary muscles, nor pulsation of the umbilical cord (if still attached)." Id. § 46.203(f). A nonviable fetus may
possess one or more of these attributes; but absent appropriate weight and age, these
attributes are not themselves sufficient to indicate viability. FErAL REsEARCH REPORT,
supra note 19, at 33,543.
" See, e.g., People v. Chavez, 77 Cal. App. 2d 621, 176 P.2d 92 (1947); People v.
Ryan, 9 Ill. 2d 467, 138 N.E.2d 516 (1956); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 265 Ky. 295, 96
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courts will usually confer blanket human status in homicide cases
as long as the child has been completely expelled from the
mother's body and has a separate and independent existence.,
Proof of independent existence frequently depends on a showing
of "independent circulation and/or respiration";' but a fetus
may be patently nonviable and still be capable of having
"independent circulation and/or respiration.""' Presumably, the
nonviable fetus has a "separate and independent existence" for
the duration of its life and, therefore, qualifies as a human person
under the homicide statutes.
The point is not clear, however, because case law usually
deals with the murder of babies at full term.' 7 In People v.
Chavez,'" for example, it was held that a viable child, in the
process of being born, may be considered a live "human being"
within the meaning of the homicide statute. Likewise, in
Singleton v. State,'" the court, citing People v. Chavez with approval, stated that a baby should be regarded as a human being
if it is viable and, after separation from the mother, capable of
life if given normal and reasonable care. Neither court expressly
decided, however, whether a nonviable, live-born fetus would
similarly be regarded as a human being.
Like the judiciary, state legislatures have not addressed the
issue directly. Most fetal experimentation statutes prohibit research on live fetuses; and "life" is variously defined.'50 Their
S.W.2d 1014 (1936); State v. Collington, 259 S.C. 446, 192 S.E.2d 856 (1972). See also text
accompanying notes 70-100 supra.
'M See, e.g., Montgomery v. State, 202 Ga. 678, 44 S.E.2d 242 (1947); Logue v. State,
198 Ga. 672, 32 S.E.2d 397 (1944); State v. Winthrop, 43 Iowa 519 (1876); People v.
Hayner, 300 N.Y. 171, 90 N.E.2d 23 (1949); State v. Collington, 259 S.C. 446, 192 S.E.2d
856 (1972); Morgan v. State, 148 Tenn. 47, 256 S.W. 433 (1923).
"I See, e.g., State v. Winthrop, 43 Iowa 519 (1876); People v. Hayner, 300 N.Y. 171,
90 N.E.2d 23 (1949).
'" See note 142 supra.
"4 See, e.g., Singleton v. State, 33 Ala. App. 536,35 So. 2d 375 (1948); People v. Ryan,
9 Ill. 2d 467, 138 N.E.2d 516 (1956); People v. Hayner, 300 N.Y. 171, 90 N.E.2d 23 (1949);
State v. Dickenson, 28 Ohio St. 2d 65, 275 N.E.2d 599 (1971); Bennett v. State, 377 P.2d
634 (Wyo. 1963).
"' 77 Cal. App. 2d 621, 176 P.2d 92 (1947).
' 33 Ala. App. 536, 35 So. 2d 375 (1948).
" In Maine "life" is defined as "beating of the heart, pulsation of the umbilical cord
or definite movement of voluntary muscles, whether or not the umbilical cord has been
cut or the placenta is attached." ME. Rxv. STAT. ANN., tit. 22, § 1576 (Supp. 1975). Note
that spontaneous respiration is omitted, even though respiratory activity is the sine qua
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language is neither consistent nor sophisticated. One is left with
the impression that most legislatures proceeded on the unarticulated premise that personhood begins at conception. Blocked
from conferring this status on the fetus in utero by Roe v. Wade, 5'
they seized upon any reasonable sign of life as sufficient to confer
personhood once birth or abortion has occurred.
What of Roe v. Wade? Unhappily, those who might have
anticipated some illumination by the Supreme Court will be disappointed. At one point the majority opinion remarks that "the
law has been reluctant to endorse any theory that life. . . begins
before live birth."'' 2 "Live birth" is not explained, however; and
in a subsequent opinion, Planned Parenthoodv. Danforth,'5 3 the
Court does little to clarify the issue. The majority opinion in
Danforth appears to equate personhood with live birth and viability; but while both the majority and Justice White employ words
such as "live-born infant"'5 4 and "live babies' '1 55 when discussing
fetuses ex utero, no distinction is made between viable and nonviable fetuses and no definition is offered.
b.

Scientific justification

In view of the ambiguity in judicial opinions, it is not surprising that when we turn from law to science, to hoped-for certainty
in the growing body of knowledge concerning fetal growth and
development, we obtain little in the way of clarification. Instead
of firm demarcation lines, we find a continuum, a process in
which there is an uneven maturation of human characteristics.' 56
There is no point of discontinuity, no point at which we can
confidently say in biological terms that this fetus is a person and
that one is not.
[Tihe advance of embryology and medicine over the past century
and a half rendered untenable any notion that the fetus suddenly
non of viability. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.203(f) (1976).
-31410 U.S. 113 (1973).
"

Id. at 161.

96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976).
'

Id. at 2848.
Id. at 2855 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

See, e.g., L. ARmy, DEVELOPMENTAL ANATOMY: A TEXTBOOK AND LABORATORY MANUAL OF EMBRYOLOGY (7th ed. 1965); G. FLANAGAN, THE FIRST NINE MONTHS OF LIFE (1962);
W. HAMILTON & H. MOSSMAN, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY (1972); B. PATTEN, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY
(rev. ed. 1976); G. Corner, An Embryologist's View, in ABORTION INA CHANGING SOCIETY
(1970).
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"came to life" in a physiological sense at a definable point during
pregnancy. Once the embryo's growth had been traced in a continuous line from a single unfertilized ovum through the unbroken processes of fertilization, cell division, segmentation (in the case of
identical twins), implantation of the blastocyst in the uterine wall,
and a gradual fetal development to the point of birth, those who
believed in the sanctity of the fetus from the "moment" of quickening, or from some other "moment", were deprived of the ability to
link their belief to any distinct physical or biological event other
than perhaps "conception", which was itself later revealed as a complex and continuous process."'

c.

An ethical view

Clearly, both scientific technology and legal precedent are
of little assistance in ascertaining whether the distinction between viable and nonviable fetuses is an appropriate one for determining the existence of human rights. In fact, the sole justification for this distinction may lie in a discussion of the ethical
issues involved in research on the fetus ex utero.
In its report to HEW, the National Commission began its
analysis with the view that the nonviable fetus "must be considered a dying subject."'' 8 The Commission then stated that this
status alters the situation of the fetus in two ways. "First, the
question of risk becomes less relevant, since the dying fetus cannot be 'harmed' in the sense of 'injured for life."" 5 Unlike the
previable fetus in utero, its potential for continued existence is
gone.
Second, however, while questions of risk become less relevant, considerations of respect for the dignity of the fetus continue to be of
paramount importance, and require that the fetus be treated with
the respect due to dying subjects. While dying subjects may not be
"harmed" in the sense of "injured for life," issues of violation of
integrity are nonetheless central.160

The Department echoes this sentiment, stating that for fetuses ex
utero "no procedures will be undertaken which fail to treat the
fetus with due care and dignity, or which affront community
sensibilities. "161
"'
15

Tribe, supra note 119, at 19-20 (footnotes omitted).
FETAL RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 19, at 33,546.

Id.
I5
160Id.
"I Id. at 33,528.
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After uttering these protestations, however, both bodies apparently conclude that the nonviable fetus' "dignity" does not
preclude all nontherapeutic research, but only such research
which alters the duration of fetal life.'62 Thus, where important
biomedical knowledge may be gained, the Commission, and the
Department by implication, apparently embrace the rationale
that they expressly reject: Nontherapeutic research on the nonviable fetus is permissible because the fetus cannot be "harmed"
or "injured" for life. In addition, the regulations provide that
researchers may artificially sustain the life signs of a nonviable
fetus-admittedly an alteration of the duration of life, but arguably therapeutic' 3-if the purpose of the research is the development of artificial life support systems.'
In arriving at what seems to be a clear compromise between
principle and practice, both organizations may have concluded
that there is no completely satisfactory way to balance the demands of medical research against the rights of a being whose
status as a legal "person" has not been definitely ascertained.
On the basis of biological facts, a categorical assertion that the
nonviable fetus either is or is not a "person" entitled to certain
rights is unwarranted. Given this uncertainty, however, caution
alone suggests that doubts should have been resolved in favor of
personhood and that the nonviable fetus should be regarded as a
full human being in the research context.
In advocating the permissibility of research on the nonviable
fetus, however, both the Commission and the Department may
have been influenced by the ethical approach advocated by Dr.
Sissela Bok. In reference to the problem of abortion, Dr. Bok has
suggested that "[w]e must abandon . . . a definition of humanity capable of showing us who has a right to live,"' 5 and examine,
instead, the reasons for protecting life. In a paper submitted to
the National Commission, Dr. Bok advanced a similar thesis with
respect to fetal experimentation. She proposed four reasons for
protecting humans from harm: "(1) [T~he victim's anguish, suf,6 See 45 C.F.R. § 46.209 (1976); FrrAL RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 19, at 33,546.
"5

See text accompanying notes 178-83 infra.

" The issue of artificially sustaining the life signs of a nonviable fetus for the purpose

of developing an artificial placenta is a major area of conflict between the Commission
and the Department. See note 40 supra.
"I Bok, Ethical Problems of Abortion, 2 HASTINGS CEN.FR STUDIES 33, 41 (1974).
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fering and deprivation of continued experience of life; (2) the
brutalization of the agent; (3) the grief of those who care about
the victim; and (4) the establishment of a pattern that ultimately
will harm all of society."'' 6
Dr. Bok concluded that none of these reasons was applicable
to a fetus in the early stages of gestational life.' 67 But this approach poses a new dilemma. Instead of a biological continuum,
we are confronted by a continuum of reasons for protecting a fetus
ex utero the further along it is in the process of development. Here
it may be equally difficult to draw a line. 68 However, in terms of
Dr. Bok's ethical analysis, the Department's 20-week minimum
age criterion for viability "' is reasonable, albeit arbitrary. Undeniably, a 19-week-old, nonviable fetus looks human;1?o but according to most medical experts, it cannot feel pain 7' or experience
emotional anguish, and certainly cannot apprehend its circumstances. 7 2 These facts, if known, could avoid possible grief to the
parents resulting from experimentation; and the parental consent
requirement can effectively prevent research which would offend
the feelings of the mother and father.' 3 Nor would research on the
Iu FETAL RESEARCH REPoirr,
',

supra note 19, at 33,538.

Id.

'u This difficulty may ultimately require that all "human" dying subjects be protected, regardless of age, expectation of life, or circumstance. P. RAMEY, THE ETmics OF
FETAL RESEARCH 33-35 (1975).
"I As minimal criteria to identify viability, the Department requires "an estimated
gestational age of 20 weeks or more and a body weight of 500 grams or more." FETAL
REsEARCH REOirr, supra note 19, at 33,552. See also notes 41 and 55 supra. These requirements are conservative. The National Commission, on the basis of a study conducted by
Dr. Richard Behrman of Columbia University, concluded that a fetus must weigh 601
grams or more and have a gestational age over 24 weeks to sustain independent growth
and development. Id. at 33,542-44. The Commission could find no unambiguous documentation that a fetus with weight and age below these limits had ever survived; and the
chances of survival of an infant weighing less than 750 grams are extremely small. Id. at
33,543.
"I Note the reaction of the jury in the Edelin trial to pictures of a fetus only slightly
older. Boston Globe, Feb. 16, 1975, at 2, col. 1. See note 31 supra.
" It is highly unlikely that the fetus has the capacity to experience pain prior to 28
weeks. See Scarf, supra note 2, at 93-94. No one actually knows, however, whether this
assertion is true. Interview with Dr. David Nathan, Professor of Pediatrics, Harvard
Medical School, Children's Hospital Medical Center, Boston, Mass., in Boston, Feb. 13,
1975.
"I Statement of Commissioner Karen Lebacoz, FETAL RE SEARCH REPORT, supra note
19, at 33,550.
"7 The regulations specify that research may be conducted "only if the mother and
father are legally competent and have given their informed consent." 45 C.F.R. § 46.209(d)
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nonviable fetus be brutalizing for the researcher.
Moreover, it seems highly unlikely that nontherapeutic research on the nonviable fetus will open the door to similar research on persons distinguished by race, religion, or status who
have been subjected involuntarily to research in the past.' Because there is almost no likelihood that it experiences pain or
discomfort, due to its undeveloped nervous system, the nonviable
fetus differs substantially from a more mature subject, even one
who is unconscious and dying. "5 Given these distinctions, it
seems unlikely that values we cherish in this society-respect for
the dignity and integrity of others-will be affronted by this type
of research. Subjecting the nonviable fetus to nontherapeutic
experimentation will not cause us to fear, as it might with research on retarded or incarcerated subjects, that such experimentation could be extended without logical, break to all others.'
To argue that nontherapeutic research is permissible, however, is not to argue that it should proceed without regulation.
Although the nonviable fetus occupies a unique status, as a person it is entitled to substantial protection. Even if its personhood
is denied, the dignity it is accorded, while not sufficient by itself
to countermand the needs of medical research, should be sufficient to compel elaborate safeguards and to eliminate offensive
and degrading forms of research. A number of safeguards are
77
discussed in section HI of this paper.
2. Research Which Artificially Sustains the Life of a Nonviable Fetus
One particular form of experimentation on the nonviable
fetus deserves special scrutiny: Research which artificially maintains vital functions in order "to develop new methods for enabling fetuses to survive to the point of viability."'' 7 A desire to
(1976). For a discussion of the informed consent provisions see text accompanying notes
190-230 infra.
''The "opening wedge" argument is usually employed by those who object to the
wedge, but cannot muster sufficient arguments against it; instead, they point to all the
dire possibilities that may result from the extension of a principle. The law is replete with
line drawing; and there are often dire possibilities on either side of the line.
Cf. In re Quinlan, 335 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
"' See Martin, supra note 3, at 565.
See notes 190-268 and accompanying text infra.
45 C.F.R. § 46.209(b)(1) (1976). See text accompanying note 244 infra for standards which should govern this type of research.
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eliminate offensive and degrading forms of research seems inconsistent with this type of experimental activity. Past research projects, such as the one in which fetuses were submerged in hyperoxygenated saline solution because their lungs were insufficiently
developed to permit them to breathe,' 7 involve methods which
offend and shock a significant segment of society. In view of this
reaction, persuasive justification should be required for activities
which so substantially assault notions of "human" dignity and
bodily integrity.
One such justification might be the argument that research
using the nonviable fetus to develop an artificial placenta meets
fetal health needs. As a general limitation on fetal experimentation, the Department's regulations require that the risk'" to the
fetus should be minimal and the least possible for achieving the
objectives of the activity, "except where the purpose of the activity is to meet the health needs of. . . the particularfetus. "I" It
would seem to follow from the regulation that any risk, pain,
indignity, or discomfort to a fetus is acceptable, if its health or
life even possibly hangs in the balance. The law appears to sup18
port this societal objective.
No one would deny, however, that for most fetuses involved
in this type of research death is inevitable. Researchers will be
able to devise sophisticated techniques which will allow them to
sustain a fetus' life signs long after it would die naturally if left
undisturbed. There is no chance that the nonviable fetus will
benefit in any way as a result of these herculean efforts, other
than having its life prolonged. As the research techniques are
perfected and the technology comes closer to achieving its objective, the struggle for life may be sustained over a substantial
period of time. Can one reasonably analogize these projects to
See note 27 supra.
See note 142 and text accompanying notes 59-60 supra for a discussion of the
difficulty involved in defining risk.
45 C.F.R. § 46.206(2) (1976) (emphasis added).
' In a recent case, a Maine court declared that a mother and father had "neglected"
their defective newborn infant by refusing to obtain "ordinary" medical care. A guardian
was appointed for the child and surgery was performed. When the child subsequently died,
the parents expressed great anguish at having been brought into court and having the
decision to seek surgery taken out of their hands. Maine Medical Center v. Houle, Civil
No. 74-145 (Supreme Court of Cumberland County, Feb. 14, 1974), reported in Washington Post, Feb. 25, 1974, at 1, col. 1.
'7
"
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therapeutic attempts to keep a patient alive through extraordinary means, when there is almost no chance for fetal survival, and
the primary purpose of the procedures is to accumulate scientific
data?
These conflicting considerations make a judgment about the
therapeutic or nontherapeutic character of the research extremely
difficult. If the possibility of life is the goal, and if any given fetus
may achieve this objective for even a limited period of time, then
the research may be characterized as therapeutic. On the other
hand, if the practical implications of the research are borne in
mind, it seems clear that most fetuses used in these experiments
will be research subjects with no hope of obtaining a real benefit.
By this characterization, clearly the research is nontherapeutic.
It may be argued, however, that this research is therapeutic
for the particular fetuses involved. Our values adjure us to preserve life regardless of its quality; and distinctions are not drawn
as to whether we should implement this value only if the preservation is for longer than an hour, a day, a week, or some other
period of time.5 3 Preserving life in all its contexts furthers an
important societal objective. It is difficult to argue, moreover,
that research designed to preserve life has an intrinsically brutalizing effect or that it opens the door to experimental actrocities
on other classes of defenseless subjects. Nevertheless, because of
the nature of this research, substantial prior animal testing
should be required in the development of an artificial placenta
before using human fetal subjects; and the participation of
human fetuses should be limited to situations where there is
some, even if remote, chance of ultimate survival." 4 These limita10 Because we should generally strive to preserve life, it does not follow that we should
be compelled to do so in all circumstances, e.g., "[when] the degree of bodily invasion
increases and the prognosis dims." In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976). Neither
should we be forbidden to do so. Parents of a nonviable fetus should be free to consent or
withhold consent to its participation in this form of experimentation.
I" Currently, the regulations provide that "vital functions of the fetus will not be
artificially maintained except where the purpose of the activity is to develop new methods
for enabling fetuses to survive to the point of viability." 45 C.F.R. § 46.209(b)(1) (1976).
See note 138 and accompanying text supra. In response to criticism of this provision by
the National Commission, see 42 Fed. Reg. 2792 (1977), HEW has proposed an amendment to "reflect the Department's actual intent ... to permit artificial maintenance of
vital functions only to enable the particular fetus 'to survive to the point of viability.'"
Id. The proposed regulation provides that, with respect to an ex utero fetus whose viability
has not been ascertained, the purpose of the research must be "to enhance the possibility
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tions would insure that nontherapeutic elements, such as the
opening of fetal chest walls to observe heartbeat, do not predominate in the research design.
3.

A Duty to Experiment?

One final issue is raised by the regulations permitting research which artificially sustains life. If this type of research is
characterized as therapeutic, may desperate parents, following
premature, spontaneous delivery of a nonviable or possibly viable
fetus, resort to legal action to compel experimentation in the hope
of obtaining a viable offspring? The answer to this question is
probably in the negative, since it is unclear on what theory parents could force physicians to reverse a decision not to experiment. A malpractice action would occur subsequent to the event5
and would be inapposite because of the customary practice rule.'8
Specific performance based on a theory of contract between parents and doctor would probably be no more successful; at best, a
doctor contracts to render reasonable, ordinary care. When a procedure has no realistic prospect of success, is extraordinary in
nature, and requires a willing application of skill in its performance, it is highly unlikely that it could or should be compelled., 6
In addition, it is unclear whether an obstetrician attending
a mother at an abortion prior to the third trimester must assume
the fetus is a patient once "birth" occurs and, in keeping with
good medical practice, act to preserve its life and health. The
Supreme Court, in Planned Parenthoodv. Danforth,'87 assumed
that criminal statutes would operate to compel treatment for
"live-born infants."'' 8 The Court struck down, however, a statute
of survival of the particular fetus to the point of viability." Id. at 2793 (Proposed 45 C.F.R.
§ 46.209(a)(2)). Once the ex utero fetus is ascertained to be nonviable, however, "[vlital
functions of the fetus will not be artificially maintained." Id. (Proposed 45 C.F.R. §
46.209(b)(1)).
Note that the proposed amendment does not prohibit highly invasive research procedures; moreover, it prescribes neither the magnitude of "the possibility of survival of the
particular fetus" nor the anticipated duration of survival. These issues are critical in
determining whether to characterize the research as therapeutic or nontherapeutic.
See text accompanying notes 255-56 infra.
Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27
STAN. L. REv. 213, 235-36 (1975).
"7 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976).
Id. at 2848. Paradoxically, the Court refused to sever the provisions of the Missouri
statute before it for consideration, and thereby struck down as unconstitutional a requirement that physicians act to preserve the life of an aborted "child."

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 53

which imposed criminal liability for failure "to exercise that degree of professional skill, care and diligence to preserve the life
and health of the fetus which . . . would be required . . . to
preserve the life and health of any fetus intended to be born and
not aborted."''8 The Court's finding of unconstitutionality appears to have been based on a reading of the statute as applying
to all fetuses, even those before the stage of viability, whether in
utero or ex utero. Presumably, then, a physician may not be liable
for failure to undertake "therapeutic" measures for a nonviable
fetus ex utero.
Ill.

PROTECTIVE MECHANISMS

The Department's regulations, in addition to establishing
guidelines for experimentation, set forth two principal protective
devices for safeguarding fetal rights. One device is a requirement
that consent of the parents of the fetus be obtained before research can be conducted. The other device involves review and
monitoring by Ethical Advisory Boards at the national level and
by Institutional Review Boards at each research institution. This
section will examine the legal efficacy of these protective mechanisms and the extent to which they are adequate safeguards.
Additional protective mechanisms will then be discussed briefly
in conclusion.
A.

Controls Established by Federal Regulations
1.

Consent Provisions

The sections of the regulations relating to experimentation
0 and nonviable fetuses ex utero19' contain
with fetuses in utero'1
nearly identical provisions on consent: The regulation pertaining
to ex utero fetuses provides that research
may be conducted only if the mother and father are legally competent and have given their informed consent, except that the father's
informed consent need not be secured if: (1) his identity or whereabouts cannot reasonably be ascertained, (2) he is not reasonably
available, or (3) the pregnancy resulted from rape."2
ID Id. at 2847.

45 C.F.R. § 46.208 (1976).
Id. § 46.209.
1 Id. § 46.209(d). The consent regulation pertaining to in utero fetuses fails to track

"u
"'

precisely the quoted language; the word "informed" is omitted from the phrase "father's
informed consent." Id. § 46.208(b).
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a.

Source

This requirement of parental consent for fetal experimentation appears to have been extrapolated from the requirement that
parental consent be obtained prior to utilization of either established or innovative medical procedures on children. Two principles govern this exercise of parental authority. First, as a general
proposition, parents in this culture have traditionally possessed
substantial independent control over their children. 193 Second,
parents in all jurisdictions have an affirmative obligation to provide necessary medical care for their children; and their failure
to do so may result in prosecution and the forfeiture of their rights
of parenthood.9 4 Thus, in a blend of these two principles, parents
are given wide latitude in the choice of medical treatment for a
child; but they must exercise their power to grant or withhold
consent on the basis of the child's best interest.'95 When a child's
condition is serious, as when death is imminent, parents may
consent to drastic therapeutic measures. Parents do not, however,
possess authority to consent to nontherapeutic medical procedures;'" and, a fortiori, they may not consent to nontherapeutic
The Department's regulations require both mother and father to be legally competent. Since males and females in their early teens are capable of conceiving children, this
competence limitation may preclude obtaining their consent to fetal research, even in
situations where the research is therapeutic. A preferable solution would be to permit
therapeutic research after consent has been obtained from other parties, such as the
incompetent parents' legal guardians, as well as from the parents themselves.
"3 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Note, The Sale of Human Body
Parts,72 MICH. L. Rav. 1182, 1194-95 (1974). But see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158 (1944).
"' See note 186 supra. Neglect "embraces wilful as well as unintentional disregard
of duty." People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill.
618, 104 N.E.2d 769, 773, cert. denied,
344 U.S. 824 (1952). The rights of a dying child to receive therapeutic medical care may
take precedence over the religious objections of his parents. Id. at 774. See also John F.
Kennedy Mem. Hoap. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971).
1,5
See note 186 supra.
Ie Cf. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). In Prince, the Supreme Court
refused to invalidate a state statute barring minors from selling newspapers and other
merchandise. The statute was applied to prohibit a child from selling religious literature.
The Court recognized that zealous attempts to distribute propaganda of any type might
create an emotional situation harmful to the child. The Court then observed:
Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow
they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children
before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can
make that choice for themselves.
Id. at 170.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 53

experimentation, 97 since the risks engendered by research are
more difficult to assess than those associated with accepted medical procedures.
Nevertheless, courts have permitted nontherapeutic procedures on children, even procedures presenting a substantial hazard, in certain limited situations. The leading case on the subject,
Bonner v. Moran, 8 involved a 15-year-old boy who consented to
be the donor in a skin transplantation procedure that was necessary to save the life of his cousin. The court held that the consent
of the minor alone was not sufficient to compel judgment for the
defendant doctor in an action for assault and battery. Inferentially, the case may be read to stand for the proposition that
parental consent would have been sufficient to enable the physician to perform the procedure, even though the procedure entailed a substantial risk of injury.
In the late 1950's, the issue of parental consent for a nontherapeutic procedure performed on a minor was placed directly in
focus by three Massachusetts cases involving kidney transplantation.' In all three cases, the kidney of a healthy child was to
be transplanted to his ill sibling; both the minors and their parents had consented. In each of these cases the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court decided that, since the donor child would
receive a psychological benefit, the parents could consent to the
operations.5°° In a similar case, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
permitted the transplantation of a kidney from a mentally retarded 27-year-old man to his dying brother."0 ' The court based
its opinion on two conclusions: The incompetent would suffer
"' However, one commentator has suggested that, because of the drastic impediment
to medical research on childhood diseases which would occur if experimentation were
curtailed, children should be permitted to be subjects of such research "where they are
peculiarly suitable and there is no discernible hazard to them." Freund, Introduction to
EXPERIMENTATION wrrH HuMAN SuBJErs at xvi (P. Freund ed. 1970).
' 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
' Foster v. Harrison, Eq. No. 68674 (Mass., Nov. 20, 1957); Huskey v. Harrison, Eq.
No. 68666 (Mass., Aug. 30, 1957); Masden v. Harrison, Eq. No. 68651 (Mass., June 12,

1957). See Baron, Botsford, & Cole, Live Organ and Tissue Transplants From Minor
Donors in Massachusetts, 55 B.U.L. Rav. 159 (1975); Curran, A Problem of Consent:
Kidney Transplantationin Minors, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 891 (1959).
' See generally J. KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WrrH HuMAN BEINGS 966 (1972).
2" Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. App. 1969).
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psychological damage from the loss of his brother; and the risk
to the incompetent donor was minimal.- 2
Other courts have rejected the psychological benefit theory,
but have permitted nontherapeutic procedures on other grounds.
For example, in a 1972 Connecticut case0 3 involving a kidney
transplant, the court discounted testimony relating to psychological benefit to the donor. Nevertheless, it permitted the operation
to proceed, holding that parents of identical twins could consent
to a transplant from one twin to the other when the operation is
necessary for the continued life of the donee, the risk is negligible,
and the parents' motives and reasoning have been reviewed by a
guardian ad litem, clergyman, and the court. 204 Another court
similarly rejected the concept of psychological benefit in the context of bone marrow transplantation.20 The court found that,
although "the evidence does not permit a finding that the procedure will be of any benefit"201 to the donor, it did "not believe that
a finding of benefit to the donor is essential ...
."207 The opinion
clearly stated that "parents have the right and responsibility to
make these decisions" 08 subject to judicial review to guard
against a conflict arising from their responsibility to care for both
children. The court must merely decide if the parents' decision
2 09
to allow their child to be a donor is "fair and reasonable.9
Several propositions can be drawn from the transplant cases.
First, a striking aspect of these decisions is the fact that the
courts never questioned the parents' right to consent to an experimental (but therapeutic) procedure on behalf of the donee-child.
Thus, parents may consent to placing their child at serious risk
if exigent circumstances justify drastic therapeutic measures and
the child might derive a benefit from them.2 11 Second, parents
may consent to a nontherapeutic procedure in which the child
202 Id.

at 149.
" Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368 (Super. Ct.), 289 A.2d 386 (1972).
2*1Id. at 390.
20 Nathan v. Farinelli, Eq. No. 74-87 (Mass., July 3, 1974), reprintedin 1974 INs. L.J.
411.
2, Id. at 412.
207Id. at 413.
20 Id.

at 414.

2W Id.

I' See note 186 supra. If the child will die without the therapeutic procedure, courts
will almost invariably grant the parents great latitude of choice.
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will be a donor if the risks to the donor are outweighed by the
benefits to the donee."' Third, there appears to be some movement away from rationalizing such parental consent to a nontherapeutic procedure on the basis of the contrived notion that the
incompetent donor receives a benefit. Finally, courts are deferential to parental authority and appear very reluctant to secondguess parents after they have made a decision concerning their
child, even though the parents have a serious conflict of interest
when both the donor and the donee children are their own.
In the context of therapeutic research on a fetus in utero, the
federal regulations embody the first proposition: As in the case
of a minor child, the parents of a fetus have broad discretion when
they act to further its health needs. In the context of nontherapeutic research on both in utero and nonviable ex utero fetuses,
however, the regulations grant authority to parents significantly
beyond that inhering in the other three propositions derived from
the transplant cases: Parents may consent to experimentation on
the fetus even though it will not provide a life-saving benefit to a
sibling."' No benefit, psychological or otherwise, need accrue to
the fetus. Moreover, courts do not even have the opportunity to
review the parental decision since no judicial approval is necessary under the regulations.
The latitude given to parental authority might be understandable were we to conclude that parents are as protective toward their fetuses as they are toward their minor children. But
common sense suggests that this assumption is not warranted;
and the number of abortions makes the point doubly clear. The
alternative conclusion is that fetuses are not as deserving of pro"' In the bone marrow and kidney transplant cases, notes 199-209 supra, the benefit
(the possibility of saving the donee's life) outweighed the risk of harm to the donor. Only
once was parental consent overridden, In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185 (La. App.), cert.
denied, 284 So. 2d 338 (La. 1973), in a situation where the transplant was not an "absolute,
immediate necessity" to preserve life. Id. at 187. The court held that it was inconceivable
that a statute absolutely prohibiting donation of a minor's property by his parents afforded "less protection to a minor's right to be free in his person from bodily intrusion to
the extent of loss of an organ unless such loss be in the best interest of the minor." Id.
"I See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.208(a)(2), .209(a) (1976). The regulations provide, however,
that the risk must be minimal to a fetus in utero, id. § 46.208(a)(2), and that research
activities directed toward a viable fetus ex utero must conform to regulations respecting
experimentation with human subjects, see id. § 46.209(c). The utility of this limitation is
open to some question, however, since the degree of risk may be impossible to gauge in
advance.

FETAL EXPERIMENTATION

tection as minor children, and that parental consent is a sufficient safeguard under the circumstances. In either event, whether
parental consent alone suffices to protect fetuses should be determined by analyzing the different contexts in which fetuses may
be subject to nontherapeutic research.
b.

Fetus in utero

Where both parents desire a child, they acquire a growing
emotional attachment to the fetus throughout pregnancy; and,
following birth, both parents are responsible for its maintenance
and support, including the provision of medical services. They are
clearly the parties most concerned about the welfare of their future child; therefore, it makes sense to assume that they will act
to safeguard the interests of the maturing fetus in utero, particu13
larly as these interests largely coincide with their own.
c.

Previablefetus scheduled for abortion

A distinctly different picture exists in the case of a previable
fetus scheduled for abortion. Here it can be argued that, where
abortion is not necessary to protect maternal life or health, the
parents have consigned the fetus to death. They are hardly the
parties who should then be charged with protecting its interests;
moreover, any research on it would, by definition, be nontherapeutic. Hans Tiefel has observed:
[Tihe pregnant woman cannot be assumed to be the parental
guardian of the fetus when non-therapeutic experiments are proposed in connection with a planned abortion. For when the woman
has decided for whatever reasons not to become a parent-and there
certainly are reasons which justify an abortion-then rights that
depend on the parent-analogy are obviously no longer appropriate.21 ,

On the other hand, it can be argued that few abortions are
motivated by malice toward the fetus. The absence of a father, a
lack of financial resources to support a child, the youth of the
parents, or a need to defer childrearing because of career demands
"' That this assumption is not invariably true, however, is demonstrated by Raleigh
Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377
U.S. 985 (1964). See note 128 supra.
"I Written comments submitted (April 24, 1975) by Hans 0. Tiefel, Kennedy Fellow
in Medical Ethics at Harvard University, to the Subcommittee of the Massachusetts
Legislature on Human Experimentation and Clinical Investigation (in conjunction with
Hearingson Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 113, § 12J (1975) held on March 7, 1975) at 8.
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are examples of nonmalicious motives. In none of these cases
would the parents necessarily be insensitive to the rights of their
developing child; and this would be particularly true where an
abortion is necessitated by the health needs of the mother.
The issue, then, is not whether maternal consent should be
required prior to research on a fetus scheduled for abortion, but
whether it is sufficient, standing alone, as a protective device.
Approval by an independent review board could be required" 5 as
an additional measure to guard the interests of the fetus. Alternatively, a procedure similar to that used when a minor donates a
kidney might be appropriate: This procedure entails, in addition
to parental consent, appointment of a guardian ad litem to obtain
2
the imprimatur of the court. 1
d.

Nonviable fetus ex utero

Similar checks on the consent authority granted to parents
by the regulations seem desirable in the case of aborted nonviable
fetuses. Supplementing parental consent to research on such fetuses with other protective provisions is both more sensible and
more humane than the approach incorporated in several state
statutes" 7 which terminate parental rights over the fetus should
it survive, except when the abortion is performed to preserve the
mother's life or health.2 1 8 Under these statutes, parents would be
unable to consent even to performance of therapeutic procedures
on the aborted fetus.
215 Review procedures are, in fact, required prior to initiation of fetal research where

federal funding is involved. See notes 231-44 and accompanying text infra.
2" Bernstein & Simmons, The Adolescent Kidney Donor: The Right to Give, 131 Am.
J. PSYCHUTRY 1338 (1974).
2"I LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1569-70 (Supp. 1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.040 (Vernon, Cum. Supp. 1977). The Louisiana statute regards a fetus which survives an abortion
as a neglected or dependent child and gives jurisdiction over proceedings involving the
child to the juvenile court. Missouri regards the aborted child as an abandoned ward of
the state and places it under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court; the mother and the
father, if he consented to the abortion, lose all parental rights or obligations vis-A-vis their
aborted offspring.
"I These statutes may be open to constitutional attack on due process grounds because parental rights are forfeited automatically without any showing of actual or pending
neglect. Cf. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). The degree of protection of fetal rights
afforded by these statutes is also questionable in that the state-appointed guardian is
potentially indifferent.

1976

FETAL EXPERIMENTATION

e. Dual consent
With limited exceptions, the regulations require consent by
both parents in order to conduct research on a fetus, whether in
utero or ex utero.211 As a means of protecting fetal interests, this
dual consent requirement constitutes an important additional
safeguard. But, for the fetus in utero, is dual consent justifiable
after Roe v. Wade"' and Planned Parenthood v. Danforth?2 '
Specifically, does the mother's privacy interest give her the sole
22
right to consent?1

In Roe, the Supreme Court confined its discussion of fundamental privacy to the pregnant woman planning an abortion.
Once conception has taken place, and the fetus is growing within
her, the choice to abort the fetus is her right alone. The Court
specifically eschewed any consideration of a father's rights,22 3 and

this primacy of the mother was reaffirmed in Danforth.12 Neither
Roe nor Danforth, however, granted a pregnant woman absolute
See note 192 and accompanying text supra.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
'
96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976).
The right of privacy is an amorphous concept whose constitutional source has
eluded precise identification. Justice Goldberg contended that the right of privacy is
protected by the ninth amendment. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-99 (1965)
(concurring opinion). Justice Blackmun concluded that the right is founded in the fourteenth amendment concept of personal liberty. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
Coherent definition of the right eluded even the imaginative Justice Douglas who discovered the right of privacy in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights. Griswold v. Connecticut,
supra at 483-85.
Since Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), the Court has slowly carved
out a zone of personal liberty which is immune to state intrusion, absent the nearly
unattainable showing of a compelling state interest. In general, this zone of privacy encompasses intimate matters associated with marriage, family, and sexual relations. The
Supreme Court has enunciated the right in cases dealing with sterilization, id., the use of
contraception by married persons, Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, and by unmarried
persons, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and the choice of marriage partner,
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). But see Doe v. Commonwealth's Atty., 96 S. Ct.
1489, rehearing denied, 96 S. Ct. 2192 (1976), afl'g 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), in
which the Supreme Court seemingly narrowed the scope of the privacy right by affirming
(without comment) a lower court decision upholding a Virginia sodomy statute which
prohibited private consensual homosexual acts between adults. Since the statute patently
infringed on intimate sexual matters, the conclusion to be drawn is that the privacy right
is restricted to heterosexual relations.
410 U.S. 113, 165 n.67 (1973).
"' 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976). The Court struck down a spousal consent requirement for
abortions, holding that a state cannot delegate to a father power which it does not itself
possess. Id. at 2841.
21

r
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bodily autonomy.2 2 5 Simply because a woman possesses a privacy
right in the first two trimesters to retain a fetus or to have it
expelled from her womb, it does not follow that she possesses
unfettered discretion to do with the fetus as she pleases in any
other respect. While her right to refuse an invasion of her body is
undoubtedly fundamental,21 it is less clear that she possesses a
fundamental privacy right to invade the body of her fetus for
experimental purposes. Or, if her maternal interest in the fetus
is a fundamental right included within the notion of privacy, it
would seem to follow that paternal rights should be on an equal
footing.2 27
The Court in Roe said:
The privacy right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be absolute. In fact,
it is not clear to us that the claim asserted by some amici that one has an
unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases bears a close relationship
to the right of privacy previously articulated in the Court's decisions ....
We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy includes the
abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). Accord, Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 96 S.
Ct. 2831, 2837 (1976). See also Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1410,
1429 (1974).
2 See In re Smith, 16 Md. App. 209, 295 A.2d 238 (1972), which upheld a minor's
right to refuse an abortion her mother bought for her.
r In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976), Justice Blackmun,
writing for the majority, concluded
that the State cannot "delegate to a spouse a veto power which the state
itself is absolutely and totally prohibited from exercising during the first
trimester of pregnancy."
Id. at 2841. By speaking in terms of delegation, the Court appeared to deny the existence
of a natural or fundamental right of fatherhood, although it stated that
[slince it is the woman who physically bears the child and who is the more
directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between the two, the
balance weighs in her favor. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S., at 153 ....
Id. at 2842. Mr. Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion in which Mr.*Justice Powell
joined, went somewhat farther, saying "that a man's right to father children and enjoy
the association of his offspring is a constitutionally protected freedom"; however, in choosing between these competing rights, he concurred that the balance weighs in the woman's
favor. Id. at 2850-51. Mr. Justice White, concurring in part and dissenting in part, disagreed:
[T]he State is not . . . delegating to the husband the power to vindicate
the State's interest in the future life of the fetus. It is instead recognizing
that the husband has an interest of his own in the life of the fetus which
should not be extinguished by the unilateral decision of the wife. It by no
means follows, from the fact that the mother's interest in deciding "whether
or not to terminate her pregnancy" outweighs the State's interest in the
potential life of the fetus, that the husband's interest is also outweighed and
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Certainly a prospective father has a substantial interest in
the fate of his unborn child, an interest ranging from possible
emotional attachment to a state-compelled duty of maintenance
and support. A father may wish to shield the fetus in utero from
unnecessary potential harm or pain; and there is no logical reason
why his wishes in this regard should be outweighed by those of
the pregnant woman, as they are in the case of abortion.2 2 The
mother's freedom to decide whether or not to terminate a pregnancy is not impaired if she is prevented from authorizing research." 9 Since experimentation is not designed to benefit her
physically, no predominant health interest can be claimed. The
father is simply asserting a legitimate interest in protecting the
fetus. Since he is a copartner in the conception, it cannot be said
that the woman alone should speak in this protective capacity.3 8
And if there are sound reasons to support maternal and paternal
consent to experimentation on a fetus in utero, these reasons
should be even more persuasive once a fetus has been expelled
from the womb.
may not be protected by the State. A father's interest in having a
child-perhaps his only child-may be unmatched by any other interest in
his life. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 ....
Id. at 2852 (footnote omitted). As the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Rehnquist joined in
the dissent, a total of five of the justices joined in either the concurring or dissenting
opinion; it thus seems that a majority of the Court recognizes the fundamental nature of
paternal rights.
r-' Where a pregnant woman's health may be endangered and experimental procedures are indicated, the regulations permit medical intervention with her consent alone.
See 45 C.F.R. § 46.207(b)(1) (1976).
rn To the extent that a decision to withhold therapeutic research might impinge on
the woman's abortion decision, it would probably be unconstitutional under the reasoning
of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 96 S. Ct. 2831
(1976).
2Support for this position may be inferred from Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972), although the case can be distinguished as it did not address the issue of informed
consent. Stanley involved an Illinois statute which presumptively held a father unfit,
because of his unwed status, to be the guardian of his children following their mother's
death; yet custody by natural or adoptive married parents or by an unwed mother could
only be terminated through a neglect proceeding. Finding a denial of Stanley's due process
and equal protection rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, the Court stated:
"The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection." Id. at
651. This language evidences an expanding recognition of paternal rights and a desire to
eliminate sexual stereotypes; it strongly suggests that, in the context of consent to fetal
research, the father should stand on a co-equal footing with the mother.
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Review Procedures

In order to expose hidden biases and uncontemplated perils,
many commentators have suggested review by a committee prior
to commencing research activities on human subjects. 23' A review
committee is probably a useful safeguard, if for no other reason
than that it forces researchers to openly articulate their procedures and objectives. This experience alone may induce the experimenters to alter research design or to halt unethical research
altogether. The extra delay and bureaucratic formality imposed
by committee review is a relatively trivial burden to insure meticulous care in protecting incompetent subjects.
The federal regulations require committee review, in some
cases by two committees, for research proposals involving human
subjects. The process is complex. In the case of experimentation
on a fetus, every proposed research activity must be reviewed and
approved in the first instance by an Institutional Review Board.232
No proposal may be funded unless Board approval is certified to
the Department. m The Institutional Reyiew Board's scope of re3I Comment, Non-therapeutic Medical Research Involving Human Subjects, 24

L. REv. 1067, 1093 (1973). See also Robertson, supra note 186, at 264, 268. It
has been suggested that these review committees not be associated in any way with
institutions sponsoring research. Note, Experimentationon Human Beings, 20 STA. L.
REV. 99, 109 (1967). Also recommended is inclusion on the committees of physicians who
are not involved in research as well as those who are. Lewis, McCollum, Schwartz, &
Grunt, Informed Consent in PediatricResearch, 16 CHDwiRN 148 (1969). One commentator has recommended a panel, fifty percent of whose members would be drawn from the
community. See Comment, Non-therapeutic Medical Research Involving Human Subjects, supra at 1093. Community representation is suggested because the decision to proceed with research often involves normative judgments; but it has also been questioned
on the ground that outside "experts" and laymen may be no more capable than parents
or physicians at resolving complex social and ethical questions posed by a particular
project. Robertson, supra note 186, at 265. Even though normative, non-technical judgments are often required, these judgments frequently must be meshed with a thorough
understanding of the technical aspects of a project. Lay members of review committees
tend to rely on those with greater technical expertise. Not surprisingly, the success of these
committees has been cited as less than spectacular. Id.
- 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(a) (1976). The Department's regulations concerning fetal experimentation do not preempt state law: "Nothing in this subpart shall be construed as
indicating that compliance with the procedures set forth herein will in any way render
" Id. § 46.201(b). A number of state fetal
inapplicable pertinent State or local laws ...
experimentation statutes (see supra note 32) impose greater restraints than the federal
regulation; and researchers must conform with these local standards even after they obtain HEW approval.
= 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.102, 46.205(3)(b) (1976).
SYRACUSE
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view is broad: It determines not only whether a proposed activity
conforms to the general standards for research on human subjects,2 3' but also whether the activity is permissible under the
applicable standards governing research on the fetus." 5 While it
is still too early to assess the precise functioning of these boards,
in all likelihood they will: (1) monitor the informed consent process;131 (2) periodically (at least once a year) monitor research
activities already approved to insure that there are no unexpected
problems or risks for research subjects; 237 (3) determine that prior
animal testing has been performed; 23 (4) insure that there is only
"minimal risk" to the fetus;2 39 and (5) insure that researchers take
no part in decisions as to timing, methods, and procedures used
to terminate pregnancies and are excluded from evaluating the
viability of fetuses used in research.4 0
Upon receiving certification of approval by an Institutional
Review Board, the Secretary of HEW has three options: He may
grant final approval, reject the proposal, or request further advice
from an Ethical Advisory Board. The Secretary will exercise this
latter option when, in his opinion, a research activity raises complex medical, legal, social, and ethical problems which require
close scrutiny and review. The regulations prescribe that two Ethical Advisory Boards be established and that they be composed
of individuals competent to deal with these kinds of problems in
the context of fetal experimentation. 2' 1 In addition:
A Board may establish, with the approval of the Secretary,
classes of applications or proposals which: (1) Must be submitted to
the Board, or (2) need not be submitted to the Board. Where the
Board so establishes a class of applications or proposals which must
be submitted, no application or proposal within the class may be
funded by the Department or any component thereof until the application or proposal has been reviewed by the Board and the Board
has rendered advice as to its acceptability from an ethical standpoint."'
2u
211

Id. § 46.101, -102.
Id. § 46.205(a)(1).

- Id. § 46.109, -110.
Id. § 46.107(f), (g).
2n Id. § 46.206(1).
"I Id. § 46.206(2).
2"

2,1
21
21

Id. § 46.206(3).

Id. § 46.204(a).
Id. § 46.204(d).
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This provision enables an Ethical Advisory Board, with the approval of the Secretary, to review every research proposal in a
given class. For example, since the fetus scheduled for abortion
and the nonviable ex utero fetus are particularly vulnerable,4 3 an
Ethical Advisory Board could require that all research proposals
involving such fetuses be submitted to it for careful review.2" ' This
procedure would constitute a desirable supplemental mechanism,
in addition to parental consent, for protection of fetal rights.
While the Secretary is not bound by a Board's recommendation,
a finding that a proposal fails to conform to acceptable ethical
standards will carry great weight.
B.

Mechanisms Not Prescribed by Federal Regulations
1.

Physician Advocates

Another possible protective device is a requirement that a
physician who is not one of the researchers be present in any
research situation to be responsible for the research subject as a
4 ' This physician
patient."
would communicate the progress of research faithfully to the parents or guardian, make sure that their
consent is truly informed, insure that every precaution is taken,
and withdraw the fetus from the research if the risk of harm is
unnecessary or too great.
Although this protective device has merit, it duplicates many
of the duties of the Institutional Review Boards. Having both a
review committee and a physician advocate would probably be an
unnecessary additional restriction on researchers in most situa243

See text accompanying notes 216-17 supra.

21"In particular, the Boards should closely scrutinize any research in which the pur-

pose "is to develop new methods for enabling fetuses to survive to the point of viability."
45 C.F.R. § 46.209(b)(1) (1976). I recommend that the following standards be applied by
the Ethical Advisory Boards for this class of research:
(1) The general rule should be that researchers may not alter the duration of fetal life;
and the development of an artificial placenta should be a specific, narrowly limited exception to the general rule.
(2) There should be no reasonable alternative to the use of nonviable fetuses as research
subjects (e.g., could a possibly viable fetus who might benefit from this research be used
instead of a nonviable fetus?).
(3) The degree of bodily invasion of the proposed experiment should be considered a
relevant factor in determining its ethical propriety.
(4) There should be a showing that the proposed experiment will result in the development of important biomedical knowledge which cannot be obtained by other means.
214 Wall Street Journal, Apr. 14, 1971, at 17, col. 4.
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tions. Moreover, the presence of an additional, independent physician would constitute an unwarranted interference with the researcher's professional responsibility, especially in the context of
therapeutic experimentation.
2.

Litigation

Another significant method of quality control-indeed,
within the medical profession currently, perhaps the most efficacious method-is after-the-fact litigation, usually in the form of
suits for malpractice. Applied to fetal experimentation, litigation
would permit the gradual development and testing of legal doctrine in this very perplexing area. A common law approach would
avoid sweeping generalizations enunciated in regulations in favor
of an adjudication of liability and assessment of damages in specific cases. Over a period of time it would probably provide the
best guide to the behavior of physician-researchers. Unfortunately, the rate of development in medical research frustrates an
unhurried case-by-case analysis of concomitant legal problems.
In addition, although rules pieced out in judicial opinions may
ultimately be of critical importance in regulating the scope of
research activities, it will be necessary first to modify the legal
doctrines which can be used as a basis for assessing liability. The
present body of judicial opinions relating to research in general
is of limited quantity and usefulness; and most of these cases
embody criteria which apply imperfectly or not at all to the facts
of fetal experimentation.
a.

Contract

Suit based on a contract theory, for example, presupposes an
express or implied contract that the physician will perform professional services in return for reasonable compensation from the
patient."' An initial problem presented by an action in contract
is identification of the parties other than the doctor. In the context of therapeutic experimentation, presumably the parents or
guardian of an in utero fetus would constitute a party, the fetus
not being a "person" under the fourteenth amendment." 7 If ex
utero, however, the fetus may be regarded as an incompetent
j. WALTZ & F.
",

INBAU, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE

See note 117 and accompanying text supra.

40-41 (1971).
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minor child capable of bringing suit in its own name as a third
party beneficiary of the contract. On the other hand, when nontherapeutic research is performed on an ex utero fetus, questions
are raised respecting the third party beneficiary status of the
fetus-no benefit to the fetus being contemplated 4 -and the
adequacy of consideration from the researcher. Moreover, measurement of damages may be extremely difficult, depending on
the fetus' stage of development (nonviable or viable) and status
(in utero or ex utero).
b.

Tort

Difficulties similarly arise in the application of tort theories
to fetal research. For example, a physician has a duty to inform
the patient or the patient's representative of "all of the material
facts of the treatment proposed, including risks of death or serious bodily harm, the probability of success, the alternatives to
the treatment (including nontreatment), and their risks and
probabilities of success. 2 49 Where the patient or his representative consents but foreseeable collateral risks are not disclosed, a
negligence issue-failure to obtain informed consent-is presented.250
If, in light of the patient's condition, the probability of success, and the severity and likelihood of harm, good medical practice requires therapeutic research, ' 5' the physician is only obligated to disclose those risks which he knows or reasonably should
know.2 52 Where nontherapeutic research is involved, however, the
result is much less clear:2 3 Can nontherapeutic research ever con2'8 Nontherapeutic research on a fetus ex utero also raises the issue of whether the
contract agreement to perform nonbeneficial procedures on a "child" is void as against
public policy.
21 G. ANNAS, THE RIGHTS OF HosPiTAL PATIENTS 58 (1975).
25 An action for battery might also be instituted:
[Tiheories of assault and battery are to be employed only where the defendant doctor has operated on a part of the body as to which no consent was
obtained or where the doctor has simply acted viciously and committed a
true battery.
J. WALTZ & F. INBAU, supra note 246, at 156.
25 If therapeutic research is not dictated by good medical practice, obtaining informed consent to the risks will not protect the physician from liability. Id. at 200-01.
252See generally id. at 191.
23 As yet, decisional law in the United States with respect to this type of research is
virtually nonexistent. Comment, Non-therapeutic Medical Research Involving Human
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stitute good medical practice, given that the research subject is
not expected to receive any benefit? Must every conceivable risk
be mentioned? It could be maintained that the standard of care
is not good medical practice but good research practice, and that,
in the latter context, the major risk to be disclosed is the very fact
that not all risks may be foreseen in advance. 5
A natural corollary of this dilemma is posed by the common
law rule that "a physician has the obligation to his patient to
possess and employ such reasonable skill and care as are commonly had and exercised by reputable, average physicians in the
same general system or school of practice in the same or similar
'
localities."255
Physicians are required to adhere to generally accepted tenets of medicine, although majority and minority views
regarding certain therapeutic practices are tolerated when there
is no evidence that one school is clearly the most efficacious. By
definition, however, an experimental procedure is not generally
accepted practice; and a physician may be acting at his peril
when he utilizes an innovative therapy. 5 In a 1935 decision which
enunciated a more liberal view, 57 the Supreme Court of Michigan
recognized society's need for experimentation to further medical
progress; nevertheless, it held that therapeutic research proce-'
dures were permissible only if they did "not vary too radically
from the accepted method of procedure." 5 " In a few cases since
that time, however, courts have permitted relatively extreme
departures from accepted practice when the patient has consented and the physician has acted prudently under the circumstances.259
Subjects, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1067, 1071 (1943). See also J. WALTZ & F. INBAU, supra note
246, at 181 n.l1.
'5' See G. ANNAS, supra note 249.
J5 WALTZ & F. INBAU, supra note 246, at 42.
J.
'5, Carpenter v. Blake, 60 Barb. 488 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1871), rev'd on other grounds, 50
N.Y. 696 (1872). The court stated:
[W]hen the case is one as to which a system of treatment has been followed
for a long time, there should be no departure from it, unless the surgeon who
does it is prepared to take the risk of establishing, by his success, the propriety and safety of his experiment.
Id. at 524 (emphasis added).
211Fortner v. Koch, 272 Mich. 273, 261 N.W. 762 (1935).
21' Id. at 282, 261 N.W. at 765.
2" See Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845 (1974);
Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 577, 317 P.2d
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Quality control by way of malpractice actions presents other,
equally troublesome problems in the context of fetal research. To
bring a successful suit, plaintiffs must prove a causal relationship
between the researcher's conduct and the injury which occurs.
For the fetus in utero, this task may be formidable: Twenty percent of all pregnancies terminate in spontaneous abortions,
usually the result of gross fetal abnormalties; 26 0 and many children are born with greater or lesser degrees of impairment. In
view of these facts, it may be nearly impossible to link a relatively
innocuous experiment with a defect or to establish that an experiment enhanced an existing defect. It may also be an arduous
proposition to establish damages, even if liability can be proved.
c.

Strict liability

These multifarious difficulties suggest resort to the doctrine
of strict liability, particularly with respect to nontherapeutic research. There is appeal in the notion that an experimenter should
proceed at his peril, that he has exclusive control of the experimental situation and should be held liable without fault if an
injury occurs. Through resort to insurance, the costs-as well as
the advantages-of medical research would be distributed among
2
all recipients of medical services. 1
Despite its appeal, however, this approach presents difficult,
perhaps insurmountable, policy choices. The spectre of strict liability might seriously chill the initiation of valuable research.
Where other controls are present, such as consent and committee
review, immunity from liability for nonnegligent injury may be a
necessary price to pay for the substantial benefits to medical
knowledge which fetal research may yield. This consideration has
particular weight where the research is therapeutic and where
doctor and patient, or, in the case of fetal experimentation, doctor
and parents, are both in search of the best therapy. In this situa170, 179-80 (1957). In Karp, the Fifth Circuit upheld a directed verdict for a physician
where the plaintiff failed to present expert testimony that use of a previously untried
mechanical heart was negligent. Apparently, the court felt that an experimental, but
therapeutic, procedure is proper where the patient consents and conventional modes of
treatment offer little hope of survival.
2w Marx, Drugs During Pregnancy:Do They Affect the Unborn Child?, 180 SCIENCE
174 (1973).
2"1See Burger, Reflections on Law and Experimental Medicine, 15 U.C.L.A.L. Rxv.
436, 439-40 (1968).
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tion, parents and fetus are in a sense joint venturers with the
physician. It seems harsh to hold a doctor solely responsible
under the circumstances, at least when a nonnegligent injury
262
occurs.
3.

Compensation Fund

If strict liability is an unacceptable approach in a society
dedicated to the advancement of knowledge through research,
some other mechanism for providing compensation, independent
of traditional notions of contract or tort, is desirable. When an
injury occurs to a fetus or its mother which involves expenses over
a lifetime, staggering sums may be involved. Compensation
through a suit for malpractice may be insufficient or unobtainable, e.g., if proof of causation is insufficient; yet parents should
not be required to shoulder the entire risk alone. Take, for example, the case of a fetus ex utero with no apparent chance of survival. The parents are told that a new experimental technique
may save the fetus, but that no one can predict the harm which
may occur through its use. Faced with this cruel choice, some
parents will consent in desperation to use of the technique. Others will understandably hesitate or refuse, in part fearing the
economic hardship which may result if they cannot obtain compensation for nonnegligent injury. In addition, a doctor confronted with the possibility of strict liability despite his exercise
of due care may equally be tempted to forego life-saving efforts
26
in marginal cases. 1
The present system offers essentially two choices if an injury
occurs: If the injury results from negligence which can be proved,
the negligent party must pay damages to the extent he is able; if
the injury results from causes unrelated to negligence, the victim
(or those responsible for the victim) must shoulder the entire cost.
This sytem is rigid and inequitable. It is important, on the one
hand, to make researchers or their sponsoring institutions bear
the costs of their mistakes as a way of insuring quality control;
"I Adams & Shea-Stonum, Toward a Theory of Control of Medical Experimentation
With Human Subjects: The Role of Compensation, 25 CAsE W. Rzs. L. Rxv. 604, 611-12
(1975).
20 Note, however, that at least 18 state fetal experimentation statutes require physicians to take measures to preserve the life of a viable fetus following an abortion. 4 FA~mEY
PLANNING POPULATION REPORTER at 111-12 (1975).
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but the fear of personal liability may dry up some kinds of useful
research; and the actual recovery of money damages by a victim
may be insufficient. On the other hand, if a subject is participating in research for the benefit of medical science, his ability to
recover for injuries should not be limited to cases where fault can
be demonstrated. Injuries constitute a research cost which should
ultimately be borne by the research industry and society rather
than by the unfortunate subject.
Society should underwrite a portion of this cost through establishment of a compensation fund."' Victims should be reimbursed from the fund upon proof of injury and a showing that a
substantial purpose of the research was nontherapeutic, 211 i.e.,
designed to benefit society rather than the subject. Compensation
should be allowed for both negligent and nonnegligent causes of
injury. In both situations, payment of the total amount of compensation should be allocated among the researcher, the research
institution, and a national fund, a scheme similar in nature to
workmen's compensation. 2 The amount paid by each party
might constitute a percentage of the whole; however, the preferable scheme would make the researcher and the research institution jointly liable for damages up to a fixed amount, with the
national fund obligated to pay the remainder. The liability of the
researcher and research institution would be lower in the case of
nonnegligent injuries, e.g., $200,000, and higher where negligence
could be proved, e.g., $500,000.
The higher amount of recovery for negligence is intended to
apply pressure on a researcher and research institution to exercise
due care. Also, by imposing strict liability for nonnegligent injuries, this scheme discourages researchers from conducting experimentation until all risks are minimized. It provides a strong incentive for Institutional Review Boards to recommend against
2" The National Commission intends to consider the establishment of a compensation fund. See FETAL RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 19, at 33,547. See also Nathan v.
Farinelli, Eq. No. 74-87 (Mass. July 3, 1974), reprinted in 1974 INs. L.J. 411.
" Until the efficacy and cost of the fund is determined, compensation should be
limited to injuries arising from nontherapeutic research. Serious consideration should also
be given, however, to compensating injuries arising from therapeutic research. Does not
society benefit from therapeutic as well as nontherapeutic research?
211Adams & Shea-Stonum, supra note 262, at 637-48. See also, Havinghurst,
Compensating Persons Injured in Human Experimentation, 169 SCIENCE 153 (1970).
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undertaking research projects until every precaution has been
taken to avoid injury. As stated by Professor Calabresi:
[Aipproval by [a review committee] of a particular experiment
will require conscious consideration not only of the possible payoff
(either in market or scientific terms), but also of the risks, converted
to money, that the project entails. This may not deter many experiments, but it may cause those involved in the most risky or least
useful ones to consider carefully whether or not the experiment is
worth it, whether or not it is best done by those who propose to do
it, and whether there is an alternative, and safer, way of obtaining
approximately the same results.27

Establishing the federal compensation fund described above
would serve at least two important objectives. By relieving researchers and research institutions of liability for very substantial
awards of damages, it would not inhibit worthwhile research. At
the same time, by furnishing compensation only if damages exceed certain amounts,2 1 it would encourage a maximum amount
of care. Such a fund, established through appropriations from
general tax revenues, would adequately represent society's stake
in medical research.
CONCLUSION

For research on the fetus, two obvious issues are presented.
The first is a matter of definition: Is the fetus a person entitled
to protection? The answer to that question shapes the second
issue: What protections should be afforded a fetal research subject during the various stages of its development?
At least for the foreseeable future, Roe v. Wade has conclusively settled that a fetus in utero is not a person entitled to
constitutional protection under the fourteenth amendment. But
a mother's fundamental right to abortion does not imply a corresponding right to experimentation; as a potential human being,
the fetus in utero is entitled to substantial protection. If this
potentiality is lost (as in the case of a fetus to be aborted or a
nonviable fetus), other factors, including the "dignity" of the
fetus, require significant safeguards before research is undertaken. Although a nonviable, ex utero fetus is arguably in a differ21
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2" A court, probably sitting without a jury unless there is an allegation of negligence,
would determine the total award; or a special tribunal could be set up for this purpose.
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ent, and less protected, status for research purposes than other
human beings, its "personhood" should be assumed if the necessary indices of life are present. A definition of humanness should
not depend solely on the present state of technological development; rather, defining the nonviable fetus as a person will spur
research efforts to expand the period of viability.
The regulations of the Department, by requiring consent by
both parents and by establishing a hierarchy of review committees, comprise significant safeguards. As a prospective control,
however, the role of the review committees is insufficiently defined with respect to both the in utero fetus to be aborted and the
nonviable fetus. Lastly, a compensation fund is not mandated by
the regulations; such a fund should be established as a means of
insuring maximum care in research efforts and as a device to
allocate more fairly the costs of research which benefits us all.

